AFGHANISTAN OR BUST

In recent days, the problem of Afghanistan has arisen anew. Amidst widespread allegations and the actual disqualification of ballots from over 400 precints, the democratic deficit of the Karzai government has been brought to the fore. The American generals responsible for planning and execution of the NATO force in Afghanistan have also questioned whether there are adequate troops to carry out the war against the Taliban. With the Obama administration seemingly committed to a continuation of moderate increases in troops in the field in parallel to the development of a peace corps for Afghanistan to dispense American knowhow and expertise to needy Afghanis, critics have weighed in with questions regarding the prospects for success and the need for clear benchmarks towards assessing progress in Afghanistan.

In the face of these questions, Professor Andrew J. Bacevich, in an op ed piece appearing in the September 7, 2009 issue of the Los Angeles Times, calls upon President Obama to make the case for engagement in Afghanistan by reassuring the American public on five key points.

In Professor Bacevich's view, Obama needs to insist that "Afghanistan constitutes a vital national security interest" such that success here would "contribute materially to driving a stake through the heart of violent jihadism". Second, Obama needs to persuade us that "armed nation building ... provides the provides the most realistic and effective way to satisfy those interests". Third, Obama needs to assure us that past is not prologue. By that, Professor Bacevich, means that "the failure of past efforts by other great powers to impose their will on Afghanistan is beside the point". Perhaps most of important of all, President Obama needs to let a skeptical American public know that "the United States possesses the money, troops, expertise and will to get the job done". Finally, Obama needs to state with absolute clarity that "no other priorities, foreign or domestic, exist that outrank Afghanistan and should have first call on the resources that additional war will consume".

That's a tall order for any president to achieve, especially after the misrepresentations, distortions and outright fabrications that accompanied the Bush boondoogle in Iraq. Worse: what support could be brought to bear in support of such assertions. Specifically, what is the truth content of each of the assertions that Professor Bacevich claims are needed to stay the present course in Afghanistan or even deepen it with respect to the military side of the equation.

Does Afghanistan constitute a vital national security interest? Hardly. An argument can be made that what is most in the interests of the United States is the denial of territory to non-governmental armed groups that would be used as a staging ground for future attacks in Europe and the United States. Afghanistan under the Taliban was just such a threat. The Taliban ceded control of substantial parts of its territory to al-Quaede and allowed that territory to be used as a training grounds for the terrorists who attacked targets in Africa, the Middle East, Europe and the United States.

Today's Afghanistan clearly does not pose such a threat. However, the presence of an ongoing insurgency by the Taliban from protected bases in Pakistan's Northwest Territories and the inability of the Karzai government in Kabul to maintain the control it once exercised in territories liberated after 2001 from the direct control of the Taliban suggest that Afghanistan is again in play. Would a victory by the Taliban - at least to the extent that the Taliban regain control of Kabul and the formal tools of government - in the immediate future imply that once again al-Quaeda would gain safe haven in Afghanistan? Not necessarily.

Certainly, the ability of the Taliban to control western Afghanistan, as well as the previously uncontrollable Tajik northwest, is open to question. That it could once again - through intimidation, ideology or control of poppy distribution - gain control of largely Pashtun Afghanistan is probably well within their reach. Certainly, the corrupt Karzai government is no match to the Taliban. Nor apparently is an undersized NATO military that cannot seize and hold Pashtun provinces in play.

Still, there is no reason to assume that a Taliban in control of most of Afghanistan would once again allow al-Quaeda unfettered access to Afghani territory. And, there's no reason to suppose that American drones and bombers would allow training camps to once again flourish without challenge.

If vital American national intest is defined as the denial of safe havens to non-governmental actors such as al-Quaeda, then American self-interest is not limited to Afghanistan. Rather, it extends into the Northwest Territories of Pakistan where both elements of the Pakistani Taliban and al-Quaeda enjoy unencumbered control of nominally Pakistani territory. How does the focus on Afghanistan deal with an even greater threat posed by these lawless Pakistan territories that a sofar ineffectual Pakistani military has been unable to tame? And, how does the fragility of the Pakistani government suggest confidence that the Pakistani Taliban can not overcome recent setbacks to pose a direct challenge to the government in Islamabad and the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons?

Third, the problem facing the United States is not limited to the Afghanistan/Pakistan border regions populated by the Pashtun. Rather, the ongoing turmoil in Somalia and the inability of any government to exercise any effective control both within and beyond Mogadishu carries with it the threat that al-Quaeda will simply re-establish itself in Eastern Africa. Certainly, there is some evidence that this is the case.

Armed nation-building presumes that there is a nation to build. Critics legitimately questioned whether nation-building could proceed in Iraq where divisions among Sunni, Shia and Kurd have yet to be meaningfully resolved. Afghanistan is in even worse shape.

Unlike the presence of rich oil reserves that might tempt disparate tribes in Iraq to cooperate, there is no such resource base in Afghanistan that could lend support to the construction of a nation-state. The largely tribal nature of Afghanistan and the presence of poppy production that is certainly not in the West's interest might suggest that rather than integrate the diverse and competing tribes into a united Afghanistan we might be better off breaking this failed state and apportioning it among various existing states. Let Iran gain control of largely Farsi speaking western Afghanistan and let Tajikistan gain territory among the Tajik speaking tribes of northwest Afghanistan. Out of rump Afghanistan, why not allow the northwest territories of Pakistan, where the Pakistani government has rarely exercised any effective control in the sixty years since indepence, to merge with their Pashtun cousins and create an Afghani state in borders more in agreement with tribal and linguistic loyalties?

If one chooses to ignore the very tribal loyalties that exist in and compete against each other in Afghanistan, then the past will once again be prologue. Controlling Kabul and imposing a government their as the Soviets tried will not work. Nor were the British any better at controlling tribes opposed to foreign rule. Allowing a corrupt government such as the present Karzai government to continue to rule, even if "legitimated" by the elections of 2009, that at best seems capable only of tolerating local war lordism and rolling back promises of an end to discrimination against women does not bode well. On such a rotten basis, no nation-building can proceed. Nor is such a feeble government likely to win over a skeptical and fearful Afghani public. At least, in Iraq there was some foundation to build on, however fragile the results have been to date. To find anything comparable in Afghanistan is to look in vain for the needle in the haystack.

And, exactly how is the United States to pay for all that would be required to make Afghanistan capable of nation-state status? With the present trillion dollar deficit, anchored upon an unfunded ongoing "war" in Iraq and an economy in trouble, the United States does not have unlimited coin at its disposal to support another Iraq type war. Borrowing more on international financial markets to support necessary expenditures for national defense is not what the international community appears willing to support without question. The United States has to get its house in order before embarking on a deepening Afghanistand engagement.

Is it fair to assume that the United States has the wherewithal in terms of armed forces and military hardware to continue such a course of action? Maybe not. The all-volunteer army that the United States has fielded has been worn down with repeated rotations into and out of Iraq. To add Afghanistan to that mix risks the destruction of American military assets. Maybe men and women will be tempted to join in unprecedented numbers to fight the good battle in Afghanistan, but it is silly to count on that happening. Indeed, with NATO allies such as Germany and Britain growing increasingly squeamish with respect to their limited participation in Afghanistan, is the United States once again facing a long-term coalition of the unwilling?

Finally, why exactly should Afghanistan be elevated to the status of primus unter pares in the sphere of foreign politics? Does the possibility that the Taliban might regain control of Kabul and allow itself to be coopted by al-Quaeda to cede territory for the latter's unfettered use outweight the danger of Pakistan losing control of its nuclear weapons or Iran developing weapons of mass destruction?

And, do domestic issues such as the rickety health care delivery "system" and attempts at reform pale in comparison to the needs of Afghanistan? Or, should we forget that global warming carries with it a far greater threat than a bunch of misguided jihadis?

Yes, radical jihadis do pose a threat to the international distribution of power and wealth. But, the so-called war on terror has done little to rein in such threats. If anything, the Bush administration war on terror decentralized terror through the partial decapitation of al-Quaeda and attracted new recruits to the campaign.

To end the threat, those most immediately impacted by these jihadis will have to take steps to deal militarily with threats on their territory, much as the Pakistani government and military have slowly come to realize. In addition, autocratic governments that are unable to meet the needs of their populations need to give way to more democratically based governments. That, however, may not be possible as long as radical Islam is able to exploit specific grievances and bundle them in opposition to governments from Saudi Arabia to Indonesia. But, the alternative - an armed West rooting out radical islam while tolerating corrupt and anti-modern tenets that we in the West intrinsically oppose now and had fought against for over 500 years - hardly seems compelling. Good luck Mr. Obama if that's the flawed course you wish to follow.