HE SAID, HE SAID; THERE'S A SURGE IN MY HEAD

As if it weren't difficult enough to keep up with the ever-changing McCain position on the "surge" and everything thing it has helped make possible in Iraq - the Sunni Awakening, a reduction in violence in and around Baghdad - Michael O'Hanlan of the Brookings Institution assures us that "McCain is three-quarters right in this debate", even though he cannot get the chronology correct. What, however, is the debate about? That, too, is becoming even more difficult to fathom. Is it simply: is the "surge" a success? Or, is it a question of where the "surge" leads us in Iraq?

Apparently, McCain wants to keep the focus on whether or not the "surge" has been a success. Why? Well, for one, it is certainly a means to needle Mr. Obama and other Democrats in the House and Senate who initially rejected the proposed "surge" and cautioned that it might likely produce a worsening of sectarian violence by letting the Iraqi government off the hook. Senator Reid's claim in April 2007 that the war appears lost looks especially silly now that a substantial reduction in violence has occurred.

Second, it is a useful device for putting Senator Obama on the spot. To date, Senator Obama has not yet come up with an effective response. Claiming that there were other factors besides the surge or suggesting we might also debate the merits of the American involvement in Iraq, as Obama has frequently done, have not taken the wind out of McCain's vocal bludgeoning. It may not even be possible to still such a cheap political diatribe. Yet, we would be wise to recall, as John Edwards did when pressed by Larry King for a quick reaction to the president's speech on the evening of 10 January 2007 announcing a temporary surge in American forces in Iraq, that "the truth is we have no idea what's going to happen in Iraq". We didn't then, we still don't now.

Nor did Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina who, on the same program with John Edwards and John McCain, have any idea of what the outcome of an increase in U.S. combat forces in Iraq would be. Also pressed by Larry King for a quick, final comment, Senator Graham indicated that he hoped the "surge" would work. As Senator Graham had pointed out earlier in the roundtable discussion, "The old strategy failed. The new strategy might fail. I think it's our best chance for victory and let's give it a chance."

Senator McCain, however, was not so shy. Unabashedly, he assured King that he strongly felt that with enough troops in certain areas, including Anbar Province that American and Iraqi forces could provide a stable environment. But even Senator McCain could not guarantee that the "surge" would be a success. Rather, he pointed out the consequences of failure. If the "surge" were to fail, then, as Senator McCain viewed it, the war would be lost and that, he felt, would have devastating consequences not only for the region, but for U.S. domestic security.

Despite Larry King's efforts to pin down his guests for a simple answer to a complex question, the fact is that even then, after President Bush's address to the nation announcing the "surge", the various guests, in a roundtable of sorts moderated by Larry King, were talking past one another. Democrats, having little or no faith in the Bush Administration, were skeptical that the proposed troop increase would have any practical effect, while Republicans hoped for the best.

How could this be otherwise? Democrats were unlikely to place any more faith in an administration that had just let New Orleans drown and seemed helpless in the face of daily monstrosities in Baghdad? Previous pronouncements by the Bush Administration that American soldiers would be greeted as liberators, that the mission had already been accomplished by April 2003, or that the insurgency consisted only of dead-enders had been torn asunder as the insurgency took hold and expanded across Iraq. Claims that the election of a new Iraqi government constitued a milestone which would usher in an era of democracy in Iraq proved to be nothing more than hogwash. The constant in-fighting within the newly elected government, the fragility of its coalition, and the inability of the government to enact any meaningful legislation were daily reminders that political reconciliation was far from certain. That the newly trained Iraqi army seemed incapable of accomplishing even the simplest of limited military objectives or even forging an identity as Iraqi soldiers above and beyond the call of sectarianism cast grave doubt on the ability of the American forces to rely on or even partner with such forces in order to reduce violence within Iraq. Was it any wonder, short of a withdrawal of American troops, that the Democrats doubted the Iraqi government would ever assume responsibility for political reconciliation and that the Iraqi army might finally stand up so that American forces could stand down, be withdrawn or redeployed to Afghanistan?

Republicans, on the other hand, focused on the need to avoid failure in Iraq, failure that seemed imminent. They rejected claims such as that made by Senator Harry Reid that the war in Iraq was already lost, though many Republicans had already concluded that the Bush Administration had badly bungled the war thus far. Still, most Republicans were unwilling to toss in their cards and walk away from the game. As long as the president's new policy, the "surge" promised a different strategy, they were willing to give it a try. Indeed, as was noted at the time, the "surge" became known as the McCain Doctrine, as Senator McCain had been its most vociferous advocate.

And what was Senator McCain advocating? Like many other military analysts in and out of government, additional troops were needed to quell the daily violence, especially in Baghdad, that threatened to descend into full-scale civil war. Yet, simply sending more troops in support of the existing strategy was not a solution either. As Senator McCain noted, for four years the American military had followed a nonsensical strategy of clear and move on. Senator McCain advocated a return to the classic counterinsurgency strategy of clear and hold, but that strategy required many more troops than Rumsfeld was prepared to field.

It seems pointless now to debate who was right. At the time, no one could have foreseen what might transpire. Indeed, one of the pillars upon which the relative peace in Iraq has been constructed was the incredibly successful Sunni Awakening, armed and encouraged by American forces, but one whose existence could not have simply been brought about by an additional 30,000 US forces mostly dispatched to Baghdad. During the president's speech only one paragraph was devoted to events that were happening in Anbar. Yet, Bush emphasized what American forces were doing in Anbar, not what the former Sunni insurgents were about to do. The fact that virtually everything positive that has occurred in Anbar Province was the result of the Sunni Awakening was buried as President Bush mentioned but in passing that "local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on al Qaeda." It was hoped that this would present American forces an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists operating in Anbar Province. As a result, Bush gave orders to increase American troop strength in Anbar by 4,000 troops. As luck would have it, however, it wasn't the increased presence of American troops in Anbar that turned the tide. Rather, it was arming former Sunni insurgents and allowing them to do battle with Al-Qaeda, whom the tribal chiefs had grown tired of.

Of course, Senator Obama has shown an unwillingness to admit that his views on the "surge" were premature, at least. A healthy skepticism, as stated by John Edwards, was clearly in order, but was least likely to be expressed by senators and Congressmen who had grown weary of Bush double talk on Iraq.

Yes, Senator McCain guessed correctly about the "surge". Or, should we simply say that his gambit paid off. Clearly, the senator was correct when he dismissed the old strategy of clear and move on as utterly absurd. As a counterinsurgency strategy, it was doomed to failure as insurgents would move back in after the troops had moved on. What was required was clear and hold. Whether the American forces were large enough to conduct clear and hold was always subject to debate. And, one could correctly note that no one knew for certain whether 30,000 additional troops would suffice. 30,000 was simply the amount of extra forces that could be squeezed out all available troops by extending lengths of deployment and cutting back on rest and retraining at home. And, the "surge" had to be temporary since it risked burning out American forces already stretched too thinly.

At the time, the "surge" was a big gamble, one whose prospects did not look especially inviting, given the level of violence in Baghdad and the inability of the Iraqi government to dismantle the militias or even to govern effectively. It was one roll of the dice that might have sunk American troops into another year of quagmire in Iraq, might have had no effect at all, might have produced a barely noticeable effect, might have had a definite, but limited impact, or might have accomplished everything Bush said it would in his speech. Who knew? In truth, no one knew.

Let's accept that the "surge", aided and abetted by the twin pillars of the Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province and the unilateral ceasefire that has more or less held between the Mahdi Army and the Iraqi government, has worked. The debate now should focus on where this "success" leads us. It is a undeniable fact that the Iraqi government has failed to exploit the era of relative calm that the three pillars have provided. Iraqis seem no more capable now than they did in January 2007 of assuming complete control of Iraq's borders and provinces. Yes, the Iraqi government is in nominal control of more provinces now than it controled back then, but whether this is a temporary phase or the start of something meaningful is hard to gauge. Regardless, political reconciliation as envisioned in the benchmarks accompanying Bush's speech have hardly been achieved, even if one agrees with O'Hanlan's assessment that on a scale of 1 to 10, the Iraqi government has achieved a 5.5, a mark that can retreat, advance or hover at this mark, depending on what transpires in Iraq.

Democrats are correct to insist that as long as substantial American forces remain in Iraq, neither the Iraqi government nor its fledling army will truly stand on its own. Proof of this has been repeatedly on offer, but no more so than the almost catastrophic hasty deployment of Iraqi forces in March to reclaim Basra from criminal gangs and the elements of the Mahdi Army who initially acted alone, but required American attack support in order to save face. The later assault on Sadr City also left many questioning the ability of the Iraqi Army to accomplish even the simplest of tasks, especially when American combat forces observed Iraqi soldiers abandoning their positions.

No, Mr. O'Hanlan, John McCain in not three-quarters right in this debate. What he wants to debate really isn't worth debating. It's simply gotcha politics at its worst. What we should be debating is where this period of relative clam leads us. Does it lead to a phased withdrawal of American forces so that they can be retrained and refurbished for redeployment to Afghanistan? Is the timeline for these phased withdrawals to be determined solely by the officers in the field, as McCain seems to desire, by the wishes of the Iraqi government, as Maliki now appears to advocate, by the pressing need for more troops in Afghanistan,as Obama acknowledges, or by the desire of an American public that increasingly regards the loss of more than 4,000 troops in Iraq for the most dubious of reasons and the most illusive of goals as reason enough alone to end the waste of American human, physical and financial capital.

Or maybe it's enough to demand that Senator McCain just define victory. Then, he might explain how the "surge" leads us to victory rather than just guide us away from defeat, as he initially proclaimed. Because it is only victory that will allow a President McCain to consider returning American troops home or redeploying them to Afghanistan.

What price victory? That storied phrase has been used repeatedly as a note of caution when considering the sheer carnage that accompanies victory. The victory at Normandy in 1944 cost many, many GIs their lives, as wave after wave of Allied forces sought to establish a foothold on Nazi-controlled French soil. Victory over Hitler justified that price.

What about Iraq? We know the price of victory in Iraq. It costs this country $12 billion per month. Yet, we don't know what the victory is that this price is being paid for. Saddam is gone, but what remains seems as dysfunctional as ever. We just don't know what victory means and perhaps we never shall, given that the basis for this war was built on lies, deception and exaggeration.

Unfortunately, Senator McCain was in on the hype from the beginning. Though even he had to admit that what ensued was badly mangled, he still refuses to draw the relevant conclusion that victory, as initially described (democracy in the desert) is unlikely to result. So, what then should we settle for, Senator McCain? Tell us now before you mangle chronology even further. Stop the distortions and contortions that threaten to render facts unrecognizable. And, above all, avoid the temptation to accuse Mr. Obama of being a defeatist who would rather win a campaign than conduct an ill-begotten war to the bitter end.

BEING JOHN McCAIN

Of all the things that should never be said, written or asserted, one should not state, as Thomas Friedman wrote in today's (23 July 2008) New York Times that "McCain was right about the surge". Forget, for a moment, that Friedman was catastrophically wrong about Iraq during the early stages when other liberal pundits proclaimed the "liberating potential" of the invasion for both Iraq and the Middle East. Forget, too, that "surge" is but a euphemism for "escalation" that was chosen to mask what could have been a potentially disastrous attempt to up the ante in Iraq. But, let's not forget the basic facts, facts that McCain contorts, misconstrues, and, when all else fails, creates on a daily basis. The "surge" is neither fish nor fowl. It was a belated attempt to rectify what many analysts and military leaders had recognized as a fundamental flaw in the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld strategy on Iraq. As General Shinseki noted, before being pressed into retirement, too few troops were expected to accomplish far too much in Iraq. The "surge" was a small step in correcting that colossal mistake.

McCain has made the "surge" the centerpiece of his electoral strategy on foreign policy. Recently, he has claimed that the "surge", a product of the post 2006 election disaster for the Bushidos and a response to the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, made possible the Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province. McCain now further asserts that the surge, opposed by Obama, was instrumental in preventing assassination of the Sunni sheikh who initiated talks with American military forces in Anbar. Had we heeded Obama's opposition, the sheikh surely would have been assassinated. Sending additional American forces to Baghdad, a feat not accomplished until summer 2007, was instrumental in keeping the Sunni Awakening alive, asserts McCain, even though the sheikh who began it all was nevertheless assassinated, despite the surge.

However one evaluates the present period of relative calm in Iraq, it is important to recognize that the "surge" was not solely responsible for what has transpired in Iraq over the past 18 months. This relative calm and general decline in violence began in September 2006, shortly before the American mid-term elections, when some Sunni tribal leaders approached American forces in Anbar Province. Those overtures led to the Sunni Awakening which McCain now claims that his "surge" facilitated. In fact, the "surge" only became a topic of political debate in the United States after the disastrous mid-term elections that saw a surge in Democratic victories in Senate, Congressional and statewide elections. And, the "surge" was the Bush Administrations response to recommendations made by the independent Iraq Study Group. Public debate about an escalation of American forces in Iraq began in January 2007, four months after the Sunni Awakening after the president address the nation on 10 January 2007,

Yet, this escalation has always been euphemistically described as a temporary "surge" in American forces that would allow a period of relative calm to ensue so that the Iraqi government could accomplish important political benchmarks that might allow the eventual stand-down of American combat forces. Mr. Bush "sold" the American Congress and public on the political benchmarks in order to avoid the appearance of endless escalation that characterized futile efforts of the Johnson Administration to gain the upper hand in the war in Vietnam. To date, even the most favorable of analysts towards the Bush Administration, Michael O'Hanlan, has given the Iraqi government a 5.5 on a scale of 11 (the 11 political indices) towards accomplishment of the political benchmarks. Whatever its military successes, the "surge" has not achieved all that has been promised.

It still might, however. Indeed, Senator Obama wishes to use this period of calm to redeploy combat forces to Afghanistan. Such an act would surely demonstrate whether the Iraqi Army and government are capable of dealing with the remaining insurgency and holding together a country that often seems on the brink of imploding. McCain, of course, tried to out-ante Obama by suggesting a deployment of three brigades to Afghanistan. Whether these additional forces would be created whole cloth out of thin air or represent redeployment of American combat forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, McCain can't seem to explain. For, in reality, he has no plan to significantly draw down American forces in Iraq. He will await the generals on the ground recommendation. And, as McCain has stated several times, he would like to maintain forces in Iraq for many years to come, much as an American military presence has been maintained in Germany and Korea for the past 50 years. That continued occupation of Iraq, albeit without risk to American troops, may everything to do with the desire of some military analysts to maintain combat troops in Iraq in order to maintain pressure on Iran and keep assets for a possible invasion of Iran close at hand cannot be ruled out. Joking, as McCain has done in the past, about the need to "Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb Iran" (sung to the tune of the Beach Boys' Barbara Ann) may not be accidental. It might well explain why McCain does not seem in a hurry to extract U.S. combat forces for Iraq.

What McCain cannot seem to fathom is that this period of relative calm in Iraq that has ebbed and flowed, but maintained a more or less steady hold and outward expansion from Baghdad is not just the product of the temporary "surge" in American military forces. Rather, the "surge" is but one of three pillars that has given the Iraqi government in Baghad and its armed forces an opportunity to address some of the major political issues remaining in Iraq. Call it what you will, but reducing this period of possibility to the "surge", as McCain proclaims daily, distorts what has made possible this period of calm.

To place the major emphasis, as the recent McCain contortions demonstrate over and over, on the "surge" as the main contributing factor in bringing about a reduction in violence, is to reverse the order of importance. As George Packer, author of "The Assassins' Gate", wrote in the July issue of the New Yorker. "The improved conditions can be attributed, in increasing order of importance to President Bush's surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes agaist Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia's unilateral cease-fire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment."

The oft-heralded Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province, facilitated by the decision of the American military to respond to overtures from Sunni tribesman by providing arms in order to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been responsible for taming Anbar. Assassinations of Sunni leaders in Anbar Province still occur, but Al-Qaeda has definitely been hurt by former insurgents who stopped fighting American forces and resisting the Shiite government in Baghdad. Without the relative calm, the Sunni Awakening initiated, the "surge", as McCain views it, would not have been as nearly successful as it has been.

On the other hand, the ongoing ceasefire of sorts between the Mahdi Army forces loyal to Moktadr al-Sadr has also led to a reduction of violence in Iraq. True, the Iraqi Army did rush headlong and prematurely into an attack on Mahdi forces and criminal gangs in Basra in March and had to be bailed out by American combat forces. True, the assault on Mahid forces in Sadr City also required American combat forces. Nevertheless, al-Sadr has recognized his weakened political hand and has withheld a declaration of open war on the Shiite government in Iraq.

To date, the Iraqi government still has not been able to fully exploit the space created by these three pillars. It has not managed to pass oil legislation that would see an equitable distribution of the profits of oil wealth among the three main ethnic divisions in Iraq. Nor has it managed to pass enabling legislation to facilitate provincial elections that are supposed to be held in October. As a result, the political realm remains fragile.

But so too do the other pillars of this period of relative peace in Iraq. Though the Sunni Awakening has done much to reduce the insurgency carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, integration of former Sunni insurgents into the new Iraqi Army has remained stalled. Whether the Maliki government will ever fully accept Sunni insurgents as fully integrated members of the new Iraqi Army remains a thorn. It is possible that the United States has merely succeeded in arming both sides of the ethnic divide in Iraq. Should the always tense relations between Sunni and Shia devolve into open ethnic violence, ecalation of sectarian violence might well have been facilitated by American arms.

On the other hand, Moktadr al-Sadr continues to remain a thorn in the side of the Iraqi government which recognizes the threat his militia poses to the Iraqi government and demands an end to violence and a dismantling of private militias in order for al-Sadr to compete in provincial elections. Al-Sadr cannot seem to decide whether he should cast his fate with the Iraqi government and risk vilification at the hands of his sometimes renegade Mahdi Army or remain outside of the government and continue to oppose American occupation of Iraq. The ceasefire continues, but its continuation rests on a shoddy foundation.

Unfortunately, McCain demonstrates none of the nuances of such analysis nor the mastery of its details in his daily proclamations on Iraq. It can't be easy being John McCain. Perhaps Cindy McCain should spend some of her inheritance and wealth generated by beer-swilling Arizonans to provide a private tutor for McCain. Maybe then he could gain a broadly based, nuanced understanding of the origin, nature and prospects of the "surge", reflect on how the United States got in this mess in the first place, consider where a successful "surge" might take us, learn something about Iraq's place in the world including its immediate neighbors and study the history of the British occupation of Baghdad in the 1920s.

Yes, it cannot be easy being John McCain. But can we or the world afford another eight years of buffoonery in the Oval Office? Can we survive another four years of Bush lite? That, my friends, is an even bigger gamble than the escalation that John McCain pushed for in January 2007. The stakes are even higher, and might not be what we can afford to risk.

NUCLEAR NIGHTMARE?

Shocking was perhaps the word that best described the average reader's reaction to the op-ed piece in Friday's (18 July 2008) New York Times. Written by respected Israeli professor Benny Morris. the title alone was chilling. "Using Bombs to Stave Off War" was the lead in an article that seemed to endorse a conventional strike against Iran's nuclear facilities within the next four to seven months. Coupled with the inconsequential high-stakes conference between the West and Iran's nuclear negotiators, is it impossible to believe that Israel would take advantage of the final months of the Bush (p)residency to attack Iran, even if this means American collusion to the extent of providing the in-air refueling any Israeli plane would need, clearing the way through Jordanian airspace, or allowing the Israelis to land in Iraq and refuel before proceeding to Iran? What possible good could come of an Israeli attack on Iran? That's one nightmare too many to contemplate.

In the 1960s, it was common to speak of the nuclear o'clock slipping towards midnight and armageddon. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union came very, very close to a nuclear skirmish. Pakistan and India took us perhaps one step closer to the brink during their 2001 - 2 round of nuclear roulette. Now, a fearful Israeli government, worried that a nuclear armed Iran would not hesitate to send nuclear-tipped missiles towards Tel Aviv, might be tempted to launch a conventional assault on Iran in order to prevent a second Islamic bomb, one within missile range of Israel. Should a conventional assault fail, Professor Morris assures us that "a ratcheting up of the Iranian-Israeli conflict to a nuclear level will most likely follow".

Indeed, should the West fail to stop Iran's dalliance with uranium enrichment in order to create enough weapons grade material to build a bomb and Israeli fail to severly dent the Iranian nuclear facilities at Natans and other sites, the Israelis (and the West) will stand before the horns of a dilemma. Either Israel and the West will face a nuclear armed Iran and await the development of a nuclear standoff ala Russia and the United States or Pakistan and India or the Israeli's will use the inevitable Iranian counterstrikes to launch a full-scale nuclear assault on Iran that will leave vast stretches of that state a nuclear wasteland for years to come.

That is scary, but it does highlight the dilemma. Indeed, with all of the West's fulmination over the shady nature of Iran's nuclear program - is it for energy or bombs or both - one question often overlooked is whether it matters if Iran acquires the bomb. Indeed, does it matter than North Korea acquired the bomb? To date, history suggests that acquisition of a nuclear device does not change the strategic balance, even though it does unsettle one's neighbors (Japan). Pakistan assumed India was trying to build a bomb and proceeded to build its own. Once at the brink of conflict with India over Kashmir, the Pakistanis discovered, as every other nuclear power before has learned, nuclear weapons may be the ultimate defensive weapon, but cannot be employed in any credible offensive manner. Will Iran succumb to this logic once it acquires the bomb? Or, will its leadership, or parts of it at least, be so hostile towards Israel that it will seek to wipe Israel from the map by nuclear weapons even if it means their own self-destruction?

From Professor Morris's article, it is not clear which factions in the Israeli governing coalition are prepared to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. One hopes that such factions exist, especially after the ill-prepared, poorly executed and badly achieved standoff with Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Not only was Israel unable to punish Hezbollah in order to retrieve its two soldiers taken hostage, it has arguably left Hezbollah much more emboldened and might well have contributed to the tipping of the scales within Lebanon. Maybe a conventional air assault on Iran is feasible - one way or the other - and perhaps it could damage Iran's capability enough to bring Iran meaningfully back to the bargaining table. But, what if they are wrong? Is Israel truly prepared to launch a nuclear counterattack?

That's a nightmare worth pondering. Equally troubling, however, is the faith required in the Bush Administration to compel cooler heads in Tel Aviv to prevail. Is such faith warranted, especially when the Bushidos seemingly trot out every couple of months a new fear-inducing headline about Iran. How many times has the United States hinted that it is prepared to launch a war against Iran? Too many to allow me to feel comfortable placing trust in an administration that has yet to demonstrate any lasting understanding of international relations. The deal with North Korea was a positive sign, but it was completely aberrant behavior from an administration hell-bent on smashing whatever remains of the Axis of Evil.

There are less than 110 days till the election in November. Less than half a year remains of the Bush Administration. Let's hope we live long enough to experience meaningful change.

IMAGES OF OBAMA

The firestorm that has erupted over the New Yorker's latest cover might prove to be nothing more than a tempest in a teapot. Certainly those most inclined to view Obama and his wife in the image depicted on that cover are unlikely to read the accompanying article. Nor are they likely to be dissuaded from believing that skullcap wearing Obama is a Muslim fanatic hell-bent on shredding the Constitution, heaping scorn on the American flag and unleashing Osama bin-Laden on a brow-beaten American public befuddled that a black African nationalist, emblazoned in an over-sized Afro, disguised in camouflage and armed with an AK-47 assault rifle. Who knew that a vote for Obama was a vote for black power? Who knew that a vote for Obama was a vote to end Christianity in America? Who knew that a vote for Obama was a vote to condemn the United States to the ashes of history?

Why all the fuss? Is it an attempt at parody as the editor of the New Yorker plaintively pleaded in interviews Monday. And, maybe even a few people get it. Or do they? Certainly, this work of cartoonist Brian Bliss is typical of his other work, displayed in the 15 July edition of the Los Angeles Times. Why the outrage?

Perhaps it is because we know so little about Obama himself. Yes, we know that he was raised in the heartland state of Kansas by his grandparents. We know he had a close relationship with his grandmother as a child. He is the product of a divorced family: an absent father and a mother who seemed to embrace the educated hippie lifestyle to the max. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Obama has a half-sister who is part Indonesian. He has relatives who are Muslim, though he himself practices a liberal brand of Christianity. He is world experienced, as he spent part of his childhood growing up in Hawaii and in Indonesia. What more could one ask of a Harvard educated, former head of the Law Review who met and married a woman of modest background (Southside Chicago) who parlayed educational opportunities to become a highly educated and capable lawyer.

But what will he do as president? Will he trash the Constitution, burn the American flag in disgust, preside over the rebirth of black power and end the Judeo-Christian dominance of the United States? Of course not! Beyond calling for an end to the war in Iraq and the dispatch of American soldiers to Afghanistan to fight a resurgent Taliban, it is difficult to discern what the election of Barack Obama might entail. We know - more or less - what McCain would do: continue the Bush economic policies that have led to the bursting of America's housing bubble, the failing of investment and full-service banks, the easing of the tax burden of America's most wealthy, and the wating of American lives in a pointless war in Iraq. Oh yes, McCain may bedeck the past as present in a new cloth of environmental consciousness. Whether he allows his aspirations with respect to global warming to overide his kowtowing to big business is another matter and one that will probably end up with a less recalcitrant American image on the environment abroad, but an America that still refuses to lead on the envirnoment and continues to plant roadblocks in the paths of other trailblazers.

McCain we know; Obama we don't. It doesn't help that some Obamistas have blessed their leader with a power of prescience uncommon among American politicians. He, and he alone, opposed to the Iraq folly from the outset. He predicted that the surge would not lead to the political results promised by Bush. Yet, with respect to the economy, we know precious little about he sees beyond the horizon. Does he come into office like FDR with a vague notion that somehow there must be a change, but with little in the way of firm policy proposals that might steer America out of the Great Depression? Or, will he offer us tepid proposals such as his suggestions how health care might be improved in the hope that no one will notice that he was a very liberal senator in his short-term in office? Moderation now, radical change later.

Even respected black politicians like Jesse Jackson seem perplexed. By pointing to the many dysfunctional elements of urban black culture, Obama seems to be talking down to African-Americans. Maybe many traditional black leaders share Jackson's sentiment that Obama needs to be castrated. Certainly, Julian Bond did not recoil in horror when Jackson whispered these thoughts his way.

What Jackson does not get and many Obama supporters do get is that Obama is a politician's Tiger Woods. He threatens no one, and his affable cool keeps us glued, even though we know that none of Woods' competitors have a chance to win unless Woods stumbles. Hillary Clinton never got it, as she tried to persuade Democrats that Obama was a flash in the pan who could not carry the party to victory in November. Like Tiger, Obama is a polyglot perhaps, a polymorph probably. In any event, both he and Tiger are an amalgam of the melting pot that is 21st century America. He is not black in the traditional sense, though his marriage to Michelle certainly raises his street cred. He could have chosen to parlay his Harvard education into business wealth. Instead, he chose to organize among the poor, an African-American minority, in Chicago.

To pin him down and decide that Obama is one thing or even to wish that he be so pinned down misses the point completely. He is everything and nothing. He is anything anyone inclined to support this embodiment of cool wishes to imagine him to be. He is nothing in that we won't know what he is capable of until he gets elected and faces challenges few presidents since FDR have faced. He may never attempt to enlarge the Supreme Court as FDR tried when faced with constant obstructionism on the part of the then conservative majority. Yet, a President Obama, even armed with large Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, will face a hostile Supreme Court.

Of course, he has one advantage that FDR did not have. He can bring about a lot of change by refusing simply to shred the Constitution as Bush 43 and company have done. Obama could even allow criminal prosecutions to proceed against the telecom companies that aided and abetted in Bush's illegal wiretapping of phone conversations. Removing the troops from Iraq and dispatching them to Afghanistan would certainly end the war of false pretenses against Iraq and engender good will in the international community. Standing up to the Pakistani military and the ISI, which sponsored and fostered the Taliban during the struggle against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and still seems too closely entangled with Taliban exiles in Pakistan, would be a positive step forward. To condition continued American assistance to Pakistan on the expansion of incipient programs to educate Pakistan's rural poor in private or government run schools that do not preach the hatred of Taliban madrassas would be another step in the right direction.

To get there you have to trust in Obama. And, maybe that explains why many were outraged at the New Yorker cover. How can you trust a man married to a Black Panther? How can you trust a man decked out in traditional (Indonesian or North African?) Islamic garb? How can you trust a man who keeps warm under the watchful eye of Osama and uses American history and all that the flag represents as fuel? You can't and the outrage is palpable. I just wish that Obama had made a cute quip before dissing the cover. Perhaps he ought to have mused who was minding the children while he was fist-bumping Angela - I mean, Michelle. Perhaps the Los Angeles Times' James Rainey got it correct when he suggested that Obama's initial reaction ought to have been along the lines of: "Hey, I thought Michelle looked pretty good in camouflage."

But, it's satire, isn't it? After all, as Sandra Laman, New York Times reader and letter to the editor writer noted, satire is defined as "a literary work in which human vice or folly is attacked through irony, derision or wit". And, as Tim Rutten in the 16 July edition of the Los Angeles Times added, "the ancient Irish believed that a poet's satire had the power to kill the target of his scorn". Certainly, the Obamas are the target and many critics feel this sort of attack has the power to at least harm, if not kill, the chances of an Obama presidency. Yet, as Ms. Laman pointed out the target of the cartoonist's wrath is amiss. What did the Obamas do to deserve this bit of pointed derision?

Nothing, nothing at all. Michelle Obama apparently has never professed a love for black revolution. She did focus on becoming a highly trained, Harvard educated lawyer. At worst, she once implied that only the nomination of Obama had given her immense pride in being American. For that, she earned the unwarranted attack of right-wing zealots who couldn't imagine why anyone of privilege would fail to appreciate the greatness of America. And, Barack? Once when visiting his ancestral homeland of Kenya he donned traditional attire. Yet, now he is draped in Muslim garb. True, Michelle and Barack have given each other the fist bump. But, wasn't that Chase Utley who fist bumped the first base coach after singling in the fifth inning during the All Star game? The fact is it took a Fox News waif to turn a harmless fist bump into a terrorist trope.

The target of the satire is misplaced. Instead of parodying Sean Hannity and every other neanderthal at Fox News or religious yokel who insist on addressing Mr. Obama by his middle name Hussein, carping constantly that Obama fails to wear the appropriate lapel flag or fabricating facts out of white middle class fear, Mr. Blitt targets the Obamas instead. And, that's why his satire fails.

A look at the partial gallery of covers by Mr. Blitt suggests that this is not the one exception to an otherwise brilliant career. Though he correctly spoofs both Barack and Hillary by having them in bed together lunging for a ringing phone at 3 am, another cover completely misses the point. In her over-the-top attack ad during the Texas primary, Mrs. Clinton opened up a can of worms by suggesting that she was better prepared to take a 3 am phone call. The response of the Obama campaign practically cried out for the skewering that ensued. But, another of Mr. Blitt's cover, a satire centered on two male sailors kissing in public demonstrates how awry his aim can be. Although the cover is understandable as parody - it is after all a take-off of a well-known WWII photo showing a sailor and his girl embracing - it misses its target. Why poke fun at gay soldiers sharing a moment of intimate passion, yet neglect to deride the fuddyduddies who still believe that Don't Ask, Don't Tell is just one more horrible Clinton policy that undermined America's confidence in its military?

Humor helps and even though a case has just been made that the New Yorker crossed a line and fingered two innocent people, wouldn't it have been more profitable to slit the sails with a casual aside and then complain about the obvious unfairness of it all. Yes, James Rainey is right. A quip might have been quite disarming. Yet, the content of Mr. Blitt's cover invented an absurdity that only exists in the minds of the most rabid Obama haters. Content counts, and, as Martin Luther King asserted it's the content of our character by which we shall be judged. The New Yorker cover is one absurdity too far, and it explains why the magazine has egg all over its collective face.

ENERGY INDEPENDENCE?

Every president since Richard Nixon has proclaimed the desire to make the United States energy independent. Yet, the United States continues to import crude oil from Venezuela, Mexico and the Middle East. Republicans, including President Bush and presidential nominee John McCain. deman that the oil companies be allowed to drill offshore and in the Alaska Wildlife Refuge. Democrats call for a windfall profits tax on big oil and somehow believe this would satisfy the American consumer's desire to hold some accountable for the big rise in the cost of gasoline. More jaundiced observers note that the United States has squandered opportunity after opportunity during the past 25 years and has left the nation ill-prepared to deal equitably with higher fuel costs. Meanwhile, truckers in Europe use their rigs to block roads and protest the even higher costs for diesel fuel overseas. Still, the average European is better able to deal with increased fuel costs. Bike sharing programs abound, mass transit systems flourish and SUVs never caught on. No one in Europe is calling for energy independence, even though the Czech Republic has now joined the Ukraine in the list of European nations that have fallen victim to dependence on Russian oil and gas. What, then, does energy independence mean?

Nothing! Energy independence is a meaningless phrase regularly pitched in the kabuki theatre that is American politics. It rests on an economic understanding that presumes little or no international commerce, requires a nation to have at its disposal all of the raw materials necessary to extract itself from international commerce in energy, and absolutely obfuscates the real world of energy economics.

Yes, at one time, the United States did develop and have at its disposal many of the raw materials needed to fuel economic growth. Pennsylvania coal and oil fostered the growth of the machine age. Exploitation of the California and Texas oil fields and the expansion of the coal industry from the Appalachians to Montana allowed that growth to continue.

At the same time, individual European nations had a different experience. Germany, Britain and France had large coal reserves. But, Rumaninan oil was crucial for the European powers. Trade was one way of acquiring oil. Colonization and conquest were other means. European countries used both.

For its part, American companies participated in the growth of the international oil market. As oil fields matured and new companies entered the market, the range of oil exploration extended into South America, Mexico and the Middle East. Cost, measured in terms of production and transportation, became a critical factor, especially with the abundance of oil in the world. Yet, overseas, nations threw off the yoke of colonialism and asserted their rights to control the oil beneath their lands. As the wave of nationalization of oil assets proceeded apace, OPEC was transformed into an organization subject to national political aims. In the 1970s, as a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Americans and Europeans awoke to the first of several oil shocks. Long lines at gasoline stations highlighted the growing dependence Americans had on overseas oil and confirmed what Europeans had long known: their economies could be held hostage to oil embargoes.

In the United States, politicians nurtured the belief that America could turn back the clock and free the United States of its growing dependence on overseas oil. Turning on the tap of Alaskan oil seemed to signify that such independence was indeed possible. Nevermind that much of the output of Alaskan oil was sold on the open market to Japan. Nevermind that the presence of Alaskan crude had little impact on the East Coast. The myth emerged that Alaska proved that energy independence was possible. The fact that energy imports kept rising, as American production costs made domestic oil less competitive, may have been noted by economists and political scientists, but remained a blur to most Americans and allowed politicians to continue to promise energy independence.

An even cursory comparison of worldwide prices indicates that American gasoline prices are neither unconscionably high or ridiculously low. Yes, European fuel costs more. But, Europeans pay much high taxes on gasoline and other fuels. Yes, gasoline costs less in Venezuela, Iran and even Mexico. And, yes, in each of these countries, the cost of gasoline is heavily subsidized even if this hurts the subsidizing economies. Iran rations gasoline; and Mexico cannot muster the investment necessary to expand its declining production by exploiting deeper, off-shore oil deposits.

So, could the United States allow more drilling off-shore and in the Arctic? Of course, it could. Already, capped wells in California's Central Valley are being retapped because now the economics warrant exploitation of these oil deposits. And, indeed, this oil is entering the American, that is California, oil market. Yet, there is no guarantee that new leases for off-shore drilling would produce new oil for the American market. There are already many leased acres that the oil companies are choosing not to exploit. And, even if new fields could be developed, there is no reason to assume that the production would go exclusively to the United States. Oil is fungible and is traded in a global market. It goes where production and transportation costs warrant it to be traded. In addition, crude oil must be refined. In the United States, refinery capacity has remained stagnant for the past thirty years as no new refineries have been built and local opposition to the building of new refineries has halted any and all construction plans. As domestic refineries are stretched to capacity, the US oil industry has supplemented gasoline supplies by importing refined products from the Caribbean. Unless the oil refiners make marked improvements in the capacity of existing refineries, establish new refineries throughout the United States or can import even more refined fuel, refining capacity will limit the ability of the United States to significantly reduce the cost of fuel.

Why not use higher fuel costs to usher in a new era where demand is made more efficient by encouraging the production of vehicles based on new technologies - hybrid vehicles, electric cars, perhaps even hydrogen fueled vehicles some day - that use less oil? Why not use higher fuel costs to justify a long-needed expansion of mass transit in American cities and suburbs? Why not use higher fuel costs and their impact on the less financially able to establish a program of subsidies and allocations that encourage the development of energy alternatives? Government buyouts of gas-guzzling vehicles above market cost might help wavering consumers to opt for more fuel efficient vehicles. Expanding mass transit alternatives and improving their reliability might encourage commuters to abandon the use of personal vehicles for daily commutes. Providing loans and subsidies to automobile manufacturers might enable companies to survive the sharp and sudden transition to a radically different transportation market.

Let it be clear. The cost of gasoline is not going to come down any time soon. Nor should it. The economics of supply and demand are having the desired effect. SUVs are unwanted and fetch rock bottom resale prices on the used car market. Demand drop-off is leading to the elimination of uncompetitive gasoline service stations. Manufacturers are touting fuel economy and rushing to expand the production of vehicles that will meet new consumer demand.

Energy independence has been used repeatedly as a mask to cover politicians' close relationships with oil producers. It has also been used to lull Americans into thinking that if only we removed the barriers to domestic oil production life continue as before. It is not, nor can it ever be, a rational program to prepare the American economy for the eventual exhaustion of oil as the main energy source and the ongoing tight relationship between energy demand and energy supply.