HE SAID, HE SAID; THERE'S A SURGE IN MY HEAD

As if it weren't difficult enough to keep up with the ever-changing McCain position on the "surge" and everything thing it has helped make possible in Iraq - the Sunni Awakening, a reduction in violence in and around Baghdad - Michael O'Hanlan of the Brookings Institution assures us that "McCain is three-quarters right in this debate", even though he cannot get the chronology correct. What, however, is the debate about? That, too, is becoming even more difficult to fathom. Is it simply: is the "surge" a success? Or, is it a question of where the "surge" leads us in Iraq?

Apparently, McCain wants to keep the focus on whether or not the "surge" has been a success. Why? Well, for one, it is certainly a means to needle Mr. Obama and other Democrats in the House and Senate who initially rejected the proposed "surge" and cautioned that it might likely produce a worsening of sectarian violence by letting the Iraqi government off the hook. Senator Reid's claim in April 2007 that the war appears lost looks especially silly now that a substantial reduction in violence has occurred.

Second, it is a useful device for putting Senator Obama on the spot. To date, Senator Obama has not yet come up with an effective response. Claiming that there were other factors besides the surge or suggesting we might also debate the merits of the American involvement in Iraq, as Obama has frequently done, have not taken the wind out of McCain's vocal bludgeoning. It may not even be possible to still such a cheap political diatribe. Yet, we would be wise to recall, as John Edwards did when pressed by Larry King for a quick reaction to the president's speech on the evening of 10 January 2007 announcing a temporary surge in American forces in Iraq, that "the truth is we have no idea what's going to happen in Iraq". We didn't then, we still don't now.

Nor did Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina who, on the same program with John Edwards and John McCain, have any idea of what the outcome of an increase in U.S. combat forces in Iraq would be. Also pressed by Larry King for a quick, final comment, Senator Graham indicated that he hoped the "surge" would work. As Senator Graham had pointed out earlier in the roundtable discussion, "The old strategy failed. The new strategy might fail. I think it's our best chance for victory and let's give it a chance."

Senator McCain, however, was not so shy. Unabashedly, he assured King that he strongly felt that with enough troops in certain areas, including Anbar Province that American and Iraqi forces could provide a stable environment. But even Senator McCain could not guarantee that the "surge" would be a success. Rather, he pointed out the consequences of failure. If the "surge" were to fail, then, as Senator McCain viewed it, the war would be lost and that, he felt, would have devastating consequences not only for the region, but for U.S. domestic security.

Despite Larry King's efforts to pin down his guests for a simple answer to a complex question, the fact is that even then, after President Bush's address to the nation announcing the "surge", the various guests, in a roundtable of sorts moderated by Larry King, were talking past one another. Democrats, having little or no faith in the Bush Administration, were skeptical that the proposed troop increase would have any practical effect, while Republicans hoped for the best.

How could this be otherwise? Democrats were unlikely to place any more faith in an administration that had just let New Orleans drown and seemed helpless in the face of daily monstrosities in Baghdad? Previous pronouncements by the Bush Administration that American soldiers would be greeted as liberators, that the mission had already been accomplished by April 2003, or that the insurgency consisted only of dead-enders had been torn asunder as the insurgency took hold and expanded across Iraq. Claims that the election of a new Iraqi government constitued a milestone which would usher in an era of democracy in Iraq proved to be nothing more than hogwash. The constant in-fighting within the newly elected government, the fragility of its coalition, and the inability of the government to enact any meaningful legislation were daily reminders that political reconciliation was far from certain. That the newly trained Iraqi army seemed incapable of accomplishing even the simplest of limited military objectives or even forging an identity as Iraqi soldiers above and beyond the call of sectarianism cast grave doubt on the ability of the American forces to rely on or even partner with such forces in order to reduce violence within Iraq. Was it any wonder, short of a withdrawal of American troops, that the Democrats doubted the Iraqi government would ever assume responsibility for political reconciliation and that the Iraqi army might finally stand up so that American forces could stand down, be withdrawn or redeployed to Afghanistan?

Republicans, on the other hand, focused on the need to avoid failure in Iraq, failure that seemed imminent. They rejected claims such as that made by Senator Harry Reid that the war in Iraq was already lost, though many Republicans had already concluded that the Bush Administration had badly bungled the war thus far. Still, most Republicans were unwilling to toss in their cards and walk away from the game. As long as the president's new policy, the "surge" promised a different strategy, they were willing to give it a try. Indeed, as was noted at the time, the "surge" became known as the McCain Doctrine, as Senator McCain had been its most vociferous advocate.

And what was Senator McCain advocating? Like many other military analysts in and out of government, additional troops were needed to quell the daily violence, especially in Baghdad, that threatened to descend into full-scale civil war. Yet, simply sending more troops in support of the existing strategy was not a solution either. As Senator McCain noted, for four years the American military had followed a nonsensical strategy of clear and move on. Senator McCain advocated a return to the classic counterinsurgency strategy of clear and hold, but that strategy required many more troops than Rumsfeld was prepared to field.

It seems pointless now to debate who was right. At the time, no one could have foreseen what might transpire. Indeed, one of the pillars upon which the relative peace in Iraq has been constructed was the incredibly successful Sunni Awakening, armed and encouraged by American forces, but one whose existence could not have simply been brought about by an additional 30,000 US forces mostly dispatched to Baghdad. During the president's speech only one paragraph was devoted to events that were happening in Anbar. Yet, Bush emphasized what American forces were doing in Anbar, not what the former Sunni insurgents were about to do. The fact that virtually everything positive that has occurred in Anbar Province was the result of the Sunni Awakening was buried as President Bush mentioned but in passing that "local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on al Qaeda." It was hoped that this would present American forces an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists operating in Anbar Province. As a result, Bush gave orders to increase American troop strength in Anbar by 4,000 troops. As luck would have it, however, it wasn't the increased presence of American troops in Anbar that turned the tide. Rather, it was arming former Sunni insurgents and allowing them to do battle with Al-Qaeda, whom the tribal chiefs had grown tired of.

Of course, Senator Obama has shown an unwillingness to admit that his views on the "surge" were premature, at least. A healthy skepticism, as stated by John Edwards, was clearly in order, but was least likely to be expressed by senators and Congressmen who had grown weary of Bush double talk on Iraq.

Yes, Senator McCain guessed correctly about the "surge". Or, should we simply say that his gambit paid off. Clearly, the senator was correct when he dismissed the old strategy of clear and move on as utterly absurd. As a counterinsurgency strategy, it was doomed to failure as insurgents would move back in after the troops had moved on. What was required was clear and hold. Whether the American forces were large enough to conduct clear and hold was always subject to debate. And, one could correctly note that no one knew for certain whether 30,000 additional troops would suffice. 30,000 was simply the amount of extra forces that could be squeezed out all available troops by extending lengths of deployment and cutting back on rest and retraining at home. And, the "surge" had to be temporary since it risked burning out American forces already stretched too thinly.

At the time, the "surge" was a big gamble, one whose prospects did not look especially inviting, given the level of violence in Baghdad and the inability of the Iraqi government to dismantle the militias or even to govern effectively. It was one roll of the dice that might have sunk American troops into another year of quagmire in Iraq, might have had no effect at all, might have produced a barely noticeable effect, might have had a definite, but limited impact, or might have accomplished everything Bush said it would in his speech. Who knew? In truth, no one knew.

Let's accept that the "surge", aided and abetted by the twin pillars of the Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province and the unilateral ceasefire that has more or less held between the Mahdi Army and the Iraqi government, has worked. The debate now should focus on where this "success" leads us. It is a undeniable fact that the Iraqi government has failed to exploit the era of relative calm that the three pillars have provided. Iraqis seem no more capable now than they did in January 2007 of assuming complete control of Iraq's borders and provinces. Yes, the Iraqi government is in nominal control of more provinces now than it controled back then, but whether this is a temporary phase or the start of something meaningful is hard to gauge. Regardless, political reconciliation as envisioned in the benchmarks accompanying Bush's speech have hardly been achieved, even if one agrees with O'Hanlan's assessment that on a scale of 1 to 10, the Iraqi government has achieved a 5.5, a mark that can retreat, advance or hover at this mark, depending on what transpires in Iraq.

Democrats are correct to insist that as long as substantial American forces remain in Iraq, neither the Iraqi government nor its fledling army will truly stand on its own. Proof of this has been repeatedly on offer, but no more so than the almost catastrophic hasty deployment of Iraqi forces in March to reclaim Basra from criminal gangs and the elements of the Mahdi Army who initially acted alone, but required American attack support in order to save face. The later assault on Sadr City also left many questioning the ability of the Iraqi Army to accomplish even the simplest of tasks, especially when American combat forces observed Iraqi soldiers abandoning their positions.

No, Mr. O'Hanlan, John McCain in not three-quarters right in this debate. What he wants to debate really isn't worth debating. It's simply gotcha politics at its worst. What we should be debating is where this period of relative clam leads us. Does it lead to a phased withdrawal of American forces so that they can be retrained and refurbished for redeployment to Afghanistan? Is the timeline for these phased withdrawals to be determined solely by the officers in the field, as McCain seems to desire, by the wishes of the Iraqi government, as Maliki now appears to advocate, by the pressing need for more troops in Afghanistan,as Obama acknowledges, or by the desire of an American public that increasingly regards the loss of more than 4,000 troops in Iraq for the most dubious of reasons and the most illusive of goals as reason enough alone to end the waste of American human, physical and financial capital.

Or maybe it's enough to demand that Senator McCain just define victory. Then, he might explain how the "surge" leads us to victory rather than just guide us away from defeat, as he initially proclaimed. Because it is only victory that will allow a President McCain to consider returning American troops home or redeploying them to Afghanistan.

What price victory? That storied phrase has been used repeatedly as a note of caution when considering the sheer carnage that accompanies victory. The victory at Normandy in 1944 cost many, many GIs their lives, as wave after wave of Allied forces sought to establish a foothold on Nazi-controlled French soil. Victory over Hitler justified that price.

What about Iraq? We know the price of victory in Iraq. It costs this country $12 billion per month. Yet, we don't know what the victory is that this price is being paid for. Saddam is gone, but what remains seems as dysfunctional as ever. We just don't know what victory means and perhaps we never shall, given that the basis for this war was built on lies, deception and exaggeration.

Unfortunately, Senator McCain was in on the hype from the beginning. Though even he had to admit that what ensued was badly mangled, he still refuses to draw the relevant conclusion that victory, as initially described (democracy in the desert) is unlikely to result. So, what then should we settle for, Senator McCain? Tell us now before you mangle chronology even further. Stop the distortions and contortions that threaten to render facts unrecognizable. And, above all, avoid the temptation to accuse Mr. Obama of being a defeatist who would rather win a campaign than conduct an ill-begotten war to the bitter end.