BEING JOHN McCAIN

Of all the things that should never be said, written or asserted, one should not state, as Thomas Friedman wrote in today's (23 July 2008) New York Times that "McCain was right about the surge". Forget, for a moment, that Friedman was catastrophically wrong about Iraq during the early stages when other liberal pundits proclaimed the "liberating potential" of the invasion for both Iraq and the Middle East. Forget, too, that "surge" is but a euphemism for "escalation" that was chosen to mask what could have been a potentially disastrous attempt to up the ante in Iraq. But, let's not forget the basic facts, facts that McCain contorts, misconstrues, and, when all else fails, creates on a daily basis. The "surge" is neither fish nor fowl. It was a belated attempt to rectify what many analysts and military leaders had recognized as a fundamental flaw in the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld strategy on Iraq. As General Shinseki noted, before being pressed into retirement, too few troops were expected to accomplish far too much in Iraq. The "surge" was a small step in correcting that colossal mistake.

McCain has made the "surge" the centerpiece of his electoral strategy on foreign policy. Recently, he has claimed that the "surge", a product of the post 2006 election disaster for the Bushidos and a response to the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, made possible the Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province. McCain now further asserts that the surge, opposed by Obama, was instrumental in preventing assassination of the Sunni sheikh who initiated talks with American military forces in Anbar. Had we heeded Obama's opposition, the sheikh surely would have been assassinated. Sending additional American forces to Baghdad, a feat not accomplished until summer 2007, was instrumental in keeping the Sunni Awakening alive, asserts McCain, even though the sheikh who began it all was nevertheless assassinated, despite the surge.

However one evaluates the present period of relative calm in Iraq, it is important to recognize that the "surge" was not solely responsible for what has transpired in Iraq over the past 18 months. This relative calm and general decline in violence began in September 2006, shortly before the American mid-term elections, when some Sunni tribal leaders approached American forces in Anbar Province. Those overtures led to the Sunni Awakening which McCain now claims that his "surge" facilitated. In fact, the "surge" only became a topic of political debate in the United States after the disastrous mid-term elections that saw a surge in Democratic victories in Senate, Congressional and statewide elections. And, the "surge" was the Bush Administrations response to recommendations made by the independent Iraq Study Group. Public debate about an escalation of American forces in Iraq began in January 2007, four months after the Sunni Awakening after the president address the nation on 10 January 2007,

Yet, this escalation has always been euphemistically described as a temporary "surge" in American forces that would allow a period of relative calm to ensue so that the Iraqi government could accomplish important political benchmarks that might allow the eventual stand-down of American combat forces. Mr. Bush "sold" the American Congress and public on the political benchmarks in order to avoid the appearance of endless escalation that characterized futile efforts of the Johnson Administration to gain the upper hand in the war in Vietnam. To date, even the most favorable of analysts towards the Bush Administration, Michael O'Hanlan, has given the Iraqi government a 5.5 on a scale of 11 (the 11 political indices) towards accomplishment of the political benchmarks. Whatever its military successes, the "surge" has not achieved all that has been promised.

It still might, however. Indeed, Senator Obama wishes to use this period of calm to redeploy combat forces to Afghanistan. Such an act would surely demonstrate whether the Iraqi Army and government are capable of dealing with the remaining insurgency and holding together a country that often seems on the brink of imploding. McCain, of course, tried to out-ante Obama by suggesting a deployment of three brigades to Afghanistan. Whether these additional forces would be created whole cloth out of thin air or represent redeployment of American combat forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, McCain can't seem to explain. For, in reality, he has no plan to significantly draw down American forces in Iraq. He will await the generals on the ground recommendation. And, as McCain has stated several times, he would like to maintain forces in Iraq for many years to come, much as an American military presence has been maintained in Germany and Korea for the past 50 years. That continued occupation of Iraq, albeit without risk to American troops, may everything to do with the desire of some military analysts to maintain combat troops in Iraq in order to maintain pressure on Iran and keep assets for a possible invasion of Iran close at hand cannot be ruled out. Joking, as McCain has done in the past, about the need to "Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb Iran" (sung to the tune of the Beach Boys' Barbara Ann) may not be accidental. It might well explain why McCain does not seem in a hurry to extract U.S. combat forces for Iraq.

What McCain cannot seem to fathom is that this period of relative calm in Iraq that has ebbed and flowed, but maintained a more or less steady hold and outward expansion from Baghdad is not just the product of the temporary "surge" in American military forces. Rather, the "surge" is but one of three pillars that has given the Iraqi government in Baghad and its armed forces an opportunity to address some of the major political issues remaining in Iraq. Call it what you will, but reducing this period of possibility to the "surge", as McCain proclaims daily, distorts what has made possible this period of calm.

To place the major emphasis, as the recent McCain contortions demonstrate over and over, on the "surge" as the main contributing factor in bringing about a reduction in violence, is to reverse the order of importance. As George Packer, author of "The Assassins' Gate", wrote in the July issue of the New Yorker. "The improved conditions can be attributed, in increasing order of importance to President Bush's surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes agaist Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia's unilateral cease-fire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment."

The oft-heralded Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province, facilitated by the decision of the American military to respond to overtures from Sunni tribesman by providing arms in order to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been responsible for taming Anbar. Assassinations of Sunni leaders in Anbar Province still occur, but Al-Qaeda has definitely been hurt by former insurgents who stopped fighting American forces and resisting the Shiite government in Baghdad. Without the relative calm, the Sunni Awakening initiated, the "surge", as McCain views it, would not have been as nearly successful as it has been.

On the other hand, the ongoing ceasefire of sorts between the Mahdi Army forces loyal to Moktadr al-Sadr has also led to a reduction of violence in Iraq. True, the Iraqi Army did rush headlong and prematurely into an attack on Mahdi forces and criminal gangs in Basra in March and had to be bailed out by American combat forces. True, the assault on Mahid forces in Sadr City also required American combat forces. Nevertheless, al-Sadr has recognized his weakened political hand and has withheld a declaration of open war on the Shiite government in Iraq.

To date, the Iraqi government still has not been able to fully exploit the space created by these three pillars. It has not managed to pass oil legislation that would see an equitable distribution of the profits of oil wealth among the three main ethnic divisions in Iraq. Nor has it managed to pass enabling legislation to facilitate provincial elections that are supposed to be held in October. As a result, the political realm remains fragile.

But so too do the other pillars of this period of relative peace in Iraq. Though the Sunni Awakening has done much to reduce the insurgency carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, integration of former Sunni insurgents into the new Iraqi Army has remained stalled. Whether the Maliki government will ever fully accept Sunni insurgents as fully integrated members of the new Iraqi Army remains a thorn. It is possible that the United States has merely succeeded in arming both sides of the ethnic divide in Iraq. Should the always tense relations between Sunni and Shia devolve into open ethnic violence, ecalation of sectarian violence might well have been facilitated by American arms.

On the other hand, Moktadr al-Sadr continues to remain a thorn in the side of the Iraqi government which recognizes the threat his militia poses to the Iraqi government and demands an end to violence and a dismantling of private militias in order for al-Sadr to compete in provincial elections. Al-Sadr cannot seem to decide whether he should cast his fate with the Iraqi government and risk vilification at the hands of his sometimes renegade Mahdi Army or remain outside of the government and continue to oppose American occupation of Iraq. The ceasefire continues, but its continuation rests on a shoddy foundation.

Unfortunately, McCain demonstrates none of the nuances of such analysis nor the mastery of its details in his daily proclamations on Iraq. It can't be easy being John McCain. Perhaps Cindy McCain should spend some of her inheritance and wealth generated by beer-swilling Arizonans to provide a private tutor for McCain. Maybe then he could gain a broadly based, nuanced understanding of the origin, nature and prospects of the "surge", reflect on how the United States got in this mess in the first place, consider where a successful "surge" might take us, learn something about Iraq's place in the world including its immediate neighbors and study the history of the British occupation of Baghdad in the 1920s.

Yes, it cannot be easy being John McCain. But can we or the world afford another eight years of buffoonery in the Oval Office? Can we survive another four years of Bush lite? That, my friends, is an even bigger gamble than the escalation that John McCain pushed for in January 2007. The stakes are even higher, and might not be what we can afford to risk.