ÇA PLAN POUR MOI!

Imagine how John and Bobby would react to the challenge posed by Russia in its two steps forward one step backward withdrawal from Georgia. They'd be spinning in their graves. Where would the West be today if the Kennedy Administration had but protested loudly and not issued an ultimatum to the Soviet Union regarding the placement of missiles in Cuba during 1962? Where would we be if President Kennedy had not assembled about him an excellent set of advisors who looked at every possible response, including the wacky ones advanced by Edward Lansdale? The chosen course, a naval blockade about Cuba, lent credibility to a game of brinkmanship that led to the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and those missiles in Turkey that had annoyed the Soviets in the first place.

Ultimata are not especially popular, it seems. To date, no one has really come out with credible proposals that could make the cost of non-compliance to the ceasefire agreements crafted thus far too expensive for Russia to persist in its actions that suggest the desire for regime change in Tbilisi. Instead, we hear the mantra that there are no good military options. Really?

It is true that the American military is overextended due to its major commitment to Iraq and minor activity in Afghanistan. The unwillingness of the Bush Administration to curtail its commitments or to redress deficiencies in the American military by enacting draft legislation to swell the ranks of the American war machine has left the United States with few land-based options. (Of course, the generals are loathe to deal anew with draftees since the discontent exhibited by many unwilling eighteen year olds during the last unpopular war (Vietnam) did not result in the most efficient American military machine desired by the Pentagon.)

Yet, a naval blockade of Abkhazia is certainly doable. Forward positioning of NATO air force units to bases in Turkey is possible. The wresting of air superiority from woefully inferior Russian air forces could easily be accomplished. The drawing of a line in the sand or the establishment of a strict timetable with no wiggle room for interpretation for the withdrawal of Russian tanks and troops to the positions held prior to 6 August 2008 is also possible.

What is lacking is the will? Condolezza Rice seems to have lifted a page from Casablanca as she now professes to see vice everywhere. Where has she been the past several years? Is she unaware of the absolute refusal of the Russians to cooperate in the extradiction of the likely culprit in the Polonium poisoning in London a few years back? Is she unaware of the assassination of Russian reporters who dared to present a non-saccharine view of politics in Putin era state-enterprise controlled media? Is Rice, the so-called Russian expert, unaware that Russia has hardly lifted a finger to aid the West in hemming in Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy technology and its refusal to rule out the development of nuclear weapons as part and parcel of its pursuit of an alternative energy source?

At least some view the matter in a more nuanced matter. On CNN, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, gave recognition to the reality that Russia appears to have done little to comply with agreements achieved so far and its behavior suggests that its motives go well beyond protecting the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Renowned Russia scholar, Strobe Talbott, interviewed on NPR, also voiced his deep concern over Russian behavior.

Yet, there are two sides to this story. To insist, as Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall did during her CNN interview that the national integrity of Georgia cannot be brought into question since that would lead to myriad other ethnic minorities to press their case, is pure poppycock. First, it fails to take into account the realities on the ground in South Ossetia and Abkhazia that demonstrate the inability of Georgia to make on its claim to national sovereignty over these breakaway regions. Russian troops or peacekeepers have been active since at least the mid-90s. And, in what other area of ethnic dispute do we have an instance where perhaps 90% of the residents of a breakaway region possess a passport (Russian) in addition to or in lieu of the one they ought to possess (Georgian) by dint of territorial integrity?

Nowhere.

It is true that the Armenians and the Azeris still dispute Ngorno-Karabakh, even though Armenia presently holds military sway in the issue. And yes, each of the Baltic Republics has to deal with a substantial Russian minority. The existence of these ethnic problem areas is not proof of the slippery slope argument. Rather, it is testimony to the deviousness with which Soviet authorities manipulated ethnic disputes by arbitrarily assigning boundaries and encouraging immigration of ethnic Russians into areas where their presence had been minimal.

Second, in a larger sense, the slippery slope has already taken shape. Once NATO decided to defend Kosovo in 1999 and allowed the United Nations to assume a offer protectorate status to Kosovo, a nominally Serbian territory, the die was cast. Granting Kosovo independence this spring merely confirmed that in some instances national integrity would not, and perhaps should not, be maintained.

Beyond the obvious anger that Russia expressed for the failure of the West to take its dissenting views into account and thereby continue in the interim at least Kosovo's status as a UN protectorate, it appears that Russia wished to apply the logic advanced by NATO to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, Russian commentators have ridiculed the obvious nonsense spouted by McCain and others who decry the Russian invasion as unbecoming a nation in the 21st century. Oops, I guess the American invasion of Iraq to effect regime change was the product of the 20th century politics, when the American Congress, controlled by Republicans, decided to make regime change in Iraq a goal of American policy during the Clinton era.

Georgia was foolish to believe that it had America's backing when President Saashkavili attempted to extend his earlier success in regaining control of the Kodori Gorge (in Abkhazia) by the ill-advised foray into Tskhinvali that led to the disproportionate Russian response. Ultimately, it will have to pay a price. It's a price that the Russians will insist upon and one that analysts who share Ms. Randall-Sherman's hopelessly delusional insistence on national integrity cannot seem to reconcile themselves to.

Georgia can be assuaged in perhaps a similar way to the method adopted by Europe with respect to Serbia. Association with and eventual membership in the European Union may be the only way to get Georgia to accept the loss of territories it cannot hope to regain control of militarily. Nor can it count on NATO membership, should that ensue, to alter the military balance. Russia will remain the locally superior military force. The West is simply not prepared to engage in war with Russia over territories that Georgia has not effectively controlled since the demise of the Soviet Union.

A contradiction? Not at all. The point of an ultimatum, one that achieves the desired result, is to put forth a credible military threat and combine it with substantive, diplomatic face-saving gestures that allow both sides to feel that each succeeded to a certain extent. The Kennedy Administration never admitted that the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey was a quid pro quo for the abandonment of planned Cuban missile sites and the withdrawal of already established missile bases. Yet, the two actions are inevitably linked.

For the present crisis to be resolved, Europe may need to issue an ultimatum to Russia. If so, it should privately convey to Russia that after Russian peacekeepers are withdrawn from Abkhazia and South Ossetia an internationally supervised vote will be held in order to allow the self-determination of these breakaway regions. Woodrow Wilson would be proud. And, the Russians would be delighted since the outcome of any such vote would surely favor either independence of the breakaway regions from Georgia or their association with and incorporation into Russia.

Alas, the idiocy of American foreign policy as practiced by the neo-cons and chicken hawks has left the United States with neither the moral suasion nor the credibility to issue an ultimatum to the Russians. Europeans, especially those powers that opposed the American invasion of Iraq, hold the moral high ground. It's time for them to act in concert.

Such a course might still leave the Kennedys turning in their graves. But, at least they would have appreciated that someone had lifted a page from ten days that shook the world. Turn off the remote and leave Casablanca to the realm of cinematic fantasy. See the reality. It can't only be Georgian refugees and the international media who witness the ceasefire that won't go away.