WELCOME BACK, WOODROW

In January 1918, Woodrow Wilson presented his fourteen points regarding the coming peace in Europe to the American Congress. Points 9 through 13 dealt specifically with issues regarding the self-determination of peoples in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary, the uniting of all Italians within the borders of Italy, and the granting of independence to non-Turkish peoples formerly locked in the Ottoman Empire. Wilson did not live to see the fruition of some of these goals. Czechoslovakia gained its independence from Austria-Hungary. Poland re-emerged among the community of nations. And, in the Balkans, a uniting of sorts of South Slavic peoples in the kingdom of Yugoslavia gave hope that perhaps a new era was underway. Unfortunately, self-determination did not extend southward as Britain and France carved up the remnants of the Turkish empire in Arabia to extend the range of these weakened, but still present colonial powers.

Of course, the creation of newly independent states in Europe did not solve all problems. The mixing of peoples throughout the ages, the development of urban enclaves ethnically different from their rural surroundings and the failure to reconcile the principle of uniting one people in one country (Germany) with the return of Elsass/Lothringen to France did not bode well for a stress free ethnic future. Ethnic Germans were trapped inside the new borders of Czechoslovakia and Italy. Despite the promise of a vote to determine their future, Austrians were denied the right to join with Germany in the creation of a pan-Germanic state.

In the Balkans, placing all southern Slavs in one state might have seemed sensible. After all, they were all Slavs and more or less shared a similar language: Serbo-Croatian. Yet, different religious backgrounds - Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim - were not necessarily unifying factors. Different political experiences - life under the Turks versus life under Austria-Hungary - also did not bode well for the creation of a viable state. The fact that many Greeks still lived on the Anatolian coast in Asia Minor while ethnic Turks still lived in the Balkans did not promise a peaceful resolution of conflicting Wilsonian principles.

And, indeed, they did not. Croats and Serbs used the interwar period to build up their own ethnic hit squads which were unleashed in the wake of Hitler's conquest of Europe. The Greeks and Ottoman Turks engaged in a short-lived war in 1921 that ultimately led to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the forced resettlement of several million Greeks and Turks and the uneasy coexistence of Greeks and Turks on the island of Cyprus. Germans in the Sudetenland chafed under rule by Czechs and Hitler was able to exploit such tensions to compel Czechoslovakia to give up these lands with the blessing of Britain's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.

Perhaps Wilson was unaware of the hopes and aspirations his fourteen points had given to ethnic minorities everywhere. In the event, the demise of Nazi Germany eliminated one of the issues unresolved by the Treaty of Versailles. Ethnic Germans were driven out of East Prussia (Kaliningrad today), the joint occupancy of Danzig/Gdansk under Polish and German authority was, already ended by the Nazis, was buried for good, ethnic Germans fled Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia and Poland was awarded part of Prussia - east of the Oder-Neisse - in compensation for the loss of its territory to the Soviet Union.

In the 1990s, the experiment of Yugoslavia came to a bloody ending as first Slovenia, then Croatia sought to free themselves from Yugoslavia. The brief war against Croatia by Serbia was eclipsed by the cruelty of ethnic cleansing that shook Bosnia-Herzogovina as Muslims and Serbs (in the Republic of Srpska) battled it out until the NATO airwar against Serbia led to the Dayton accords. With the independence of Kosova from Serbia in 2008 and the peaceful splitting of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia seemed to put an end to most struggles for self-determination within Europe. True, the Basques remained unsatisfied with their status in Spain and occasional bombings and kidnappings punctuated their demand for independence. Yet, most of Europe was committed to a peaceful resolution of remaining issues whether it be the fate of Belgium or autonomy for German speaking citizens in South Tyrol.

Unfortunately, with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic issues long suppressed in the Soviet Empire began to reemerge. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had to deal with the effects of massive Russian immigration to these former Soviet republics after World War II. The emergence of independent states in the Caucusus region - Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan - immediately led to ethnic conflicts that escalated to open warfare in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and in Armenia over Ngorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan. The presence of a buffer Georgian state between Armenia and Russia allowed Armenia to escape with a military resolution of its claim over Ngorno-Karabakh in Armenia's favor. (Nachichevan, a province of Azerbaijan, but located to the south and west of Armenia and completely cut off from Azerbaijan, remains a bone of contention.) The same could not be said for Georgia. Russian troops came to the aide of breakaway regions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Though Georgia claimed sovereignty over these regions and ethnic Georgians did still reside in some parts of these disputed regions, the presence of Russian "peacekeepers" and the later issuance of Russian passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to perhaps 90% of the populations of these breakaway regions certainly suggested to rebel Abkhaz and South Ossetians that George would never ever be able to reassert sovereignty over these regions.

Georgia finally was able to reassert control over the one region in dispute that did not border Russia. The southern province of Ajara was brought back under full Georgian authority not least because of the corruption of its dictatorial leader during its "independence". Yet, the Georgian gambit to regain control of South Ossetia blew up horribly during the 2008 Olympics. A Georgian military foray into the South Ossetian capital was ferociously resisted by rebels and Russian forces. Russian tanks poured across the border into South Ossetia and pressed forward into Georgia proper via Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

As understandable as Georgian frustrations with respect to its citizens driven from Abkhazia and as vexing as the inability to resolve the twin issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia peacefully due to Russian intransigence inevitably raise the question as to Georgia's future. Should the republic continue to insist that its sovereignty extends to those regions assigned to it during Soviet times? Or, should the Georgians accept the loss of these regions and their possible incorporation into Russia?

They may not have a choice. As Russia uses the present "ceasefire" to maintain its grip over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and extend its presence in Georgia, Georgia may be presented with a fait accompli. Acceptance of Georgia of the new status quo may depend on the extension of NATO membership to Georgia and the commitment of European developmental funds to Georgia and its eventual admission into the European Community.

Whether Russia will agree to such an arrangement depends very much on its intentions with respect to the present crisis. Certainly, the Georgians precipitated a Russian response, but that response had been long planned as it seems. And, the Georgian response was the culmination of failed attempts to restart negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues. The latest failure, the attempt to negotiate in Bonn under the aegis of United Nations' General Secretary Ban-ki Moon Group of Friends of Georgia, may have signaled that neither Russian nor its protectorates has any incentive to resolve the issues based on continued Georgian sovereignty.

Does Russia wish to recreate a greater Russian sphere of influence in the Caucuses? Is it signalling its desire to bring back former Soviet republics such as the Ukraine and Georgia back into Russia proper? Is Russia using the present dispute over South Ossetia to express its extreme discontent over the granting of independence to Kosovo earlier in the year?

The Russian Duma did hold hearings after the granting of independence of Kosovo in order to determine whether the principle established by the United Nations should also be applied to Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Though no one seriously expects these regions to remain independent should the Kosovo principle be extended to these areas of dispute, the Russians do have a point. As Wilson might have agreed, the residents of these areas ought to have some right of self-determination, even if that means reuniting with Russia.

Certainly Georgia might not wish to allow a vote of self-determination. It may not have any choice anyway. Romania, however, has a stronger case. Moldova is a region historically associated with Romania. Yet, during the post-World War II period, Russians were sent to the area after it was wrested from Romania as part of the post war settlement. Does this eliminate Romania's historical claim to Moldavia?

Wilson opened this can of worms by clearing expressing the principle of self-determination. The practicalities have eluded us ever since. Just as Romania might lay an historic claim to Moldavia, so too can Hungary lay claim to Transylvania, now a part of Romania. At some point, realities on the ground should be allowed to decide the immediate. Let Moldova go just as South Ossetia and Abkhazia ought to be allowed to go.

What Wilson failed to anticipate and what gives hope that his dream of self-determination of peoples might just succeed was the creation of the European Community and its extension beyond the original six members of the European Coal and Steel Agreement. Whether Transylvania nominally belongs to Hungary or Romania does not matter as long as within the structure of the European Community minorities retain their rights and have a place to sue for grievances (the European Court) and can freely move about. Georgians may not obtain that right if both South Ossetia and Abkhazia eventually return to Russia. But membership in NATO and the EC just might allow them to maintain their independence of Russia, to continue along the path of democracy and to enjoy further economic development.