ET TU, EUROPA?

With all the Sturm and Drang the Russian offensive against Georgia has unleashed in the United States, it's easy to conclude that much of this is the inevitable response of the moronic foreign policy mavens who have made a hash of American foreign policy for the past eight years. They were warned about 9/11, but chose to ignore FBI reports and daily foreign policy briefings. Bush looked Putin in eye and was mesmerized by his baby blues. Claiming to have known the man, Bush chose to turn a blind eye toward the collapse of democracy in Russia as political assassination was used to deal with a recalcitrant press and state run industry was used to buy out independent media outlets. Encouraging both Georgia and the Ukraine to seek membership in NATO and providing American military training to the nascent Georgian army predictably antagonized a Russia still smarting over NATO's and the UN's treatment of Kosovo since 1999 and especially during the spring of 2008. Nevertheless, the failure to make an issue of the role of Russian peackeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the issuance of Russian passports to nominally Georgian citizens openly defiant of attempts by Tbilisi to reassert national authority over these breakaway regions coupled with the complete failure to plan for the possibly impossible: a Russian incursion, predicated on a foolhardy Georgian attempt to extend its string of successes (over Ajara and regaining a Georgian present in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia) to Tskinkavali, into Georgia proper, has left the West claiming that there are very few options left.

Uncertain about the ultimate aims of the Russian incursion, Nicholas Sarkozy worked out a hastily arranged ceasefire whose specifics were differently interpreted by Tbilisi, Moscow and Paris. In the interim, Russian tanks pressed further into Georgia and paramilitary separatists from the breakaway regions proceeded into Georgia as well in order to rape and pillage those parts of Georgia no longer defended by the Georgian military. A second ceasefire agreement was required in order to clarify the vagueness of the first with respect to a timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops back to the status quo ante of 6 August 2008. From what appears to be happening on the ground, yet a third ceasefire agreement may be required as Russian tanks keep pressing closer to Tbilisi.

Beyond the usual difficulty of getting the European Union to act as one, the constant refrain that there are precious few (military) options is repeated as mantra. If, by military options, reference is made to ground troops intervening in Georgia to stand as a buffer or tripwire between the Georgian capital and advancing Russian tanks, then there probably are not any such troops available. The American military is already overextended by the military sideshow in Iraq. NATO is taxed to the max by its intervention in Afghanistan. And, there does not seem to be a general willingness in any European capital to call up reserves in order to put together a credible military force (troops) to intervene in Georgia.

However, such an analysis fails to examine whether NATO air and naval forces could lend emphasis to the urgency of Russian compliance with ceasefire agreements. These forces are not stretched too thinly by the Iraqi or the Afghani operations. As such, they could provide an implied response if Russia does not withdraw its forces immediately and puts an end to the looting of the Georgian countryside.

In the 19th century, the issuance of such ultimata was typical. However, given the disastrous results of ultimata issued in the wake of the assassination of the Austrian archduke in Sarajevo which led to all-side mobilizations for general war, ultimata have been rarely used. The last major ultimatum issued was the imposition of a naval blockade about Cuba during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It worked but not before the world had to fret during ten days that shook the world.

For ultimata to work, the implied military threat must be credible. Would the designation of a line beyond which Russian tanks dare not advance lest they be fired upon by NATO aircraft pose a credible threat? Maybe. One thing it would probably not lead to, as some critics have asserted, is a natural gas embargo against Europe. And, even if one were attempted, it's the wrong time of the year to attempt a natural gas embargo in order to bring Europe to its knees. The best time for that would be winter.

An ultimatum certainly would not lead to nuclear retaliation, as some bloggers have asserted. The Russian nuclear capability has degraded to a certain extent and the problem still remains: would any rational leader risk mutually assured destruction over limited geo-political aims? The answer now, as it was back in 1962, was no.

At the same time, there must be an incentive for the Russians to comply with the ceasefire agreements achieved so far and perhaps the additional ones to be negotiated in days to come. No one benefits from the status quo ante. As much as Russia enjoys all the tactical and strategic advantages from the presence of its peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian military might and the unilateral issuances of passports has not dissuaded Georgia from an eventual reassertion of state control over the breakaway regions. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Russians perhaps are seeking regime change in Tbilisi is that the Georgian government seems loathe to abandon its desire to restore complete national sovereignty over its territory.

On the other hand, the status quo ante does not offer Georgia much other than the return to its own control of undisputed Georgian territory, as well as perhaps the regaining of the Kodori Gorge, now reoccupied by insurgent and Russian forces. The status quo ante does not eliminate the basis for Georgian discontent.

Unfortunately, there will be a price for Georgian foolhardiness. Territorial integrity, as proclaimed by Georgia, is probably a non-starter. Whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia attain de facto independence as autonomous regions within Georgia, an existence as independent statelets, or reintegration into Russia, one outcome can be ruled out. Russia will never agree to Georgian sovereignty over these regions. To stubbornly assert territorial integrity is to risk further Russian hostility.

Georgia can be compensated for the formal loss of territory it hasn't controlled since the early 1990s. Immediate accession to NATO and an accelerated membership into the European Union could erase some of the inevitable bitterness that the permanent loss of territory entails. In this regard, the case of Serbia is no different from Georgia. Serbia cannot reacquire Kosovo, despite its deeply rooted historic claims. Both population dynamics and the realities on the ground doom any Serbian wishful thinking. Membership in the European Union does, however, concrete benefits to a Serbia and could succeed in loosening the ties that bind Russia and Serbia.

Despite Saaskashvili's vigorous protestations to the contrary, we are not witnessing a reprise of Munich in 1938. German troops did not occupy Bohemia or Moravia. Nazi Germany had not issued passports to nominally Czech, German speaking citizens. It did threaten military intervention and was willing to use fifth column elements in the Sudetenland as an excuse to intervene military, but Munich was a deal conceived as a means to avert warfare. Georgia, on the other hand, is dealing with an army of occupation that is presiding over the looting of the Georgian countryside.

Nor are the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 especially illuminating contrary to Ms. Rice's assertions. Both of these countries lay behind the then Iron Curtain and NATO had no possible means to assert any military force without invading another country or inviting a response from Warsaw Pact forces. That John Foster Dulles promised American assistance to Hungary is as irrelevant now as it was then. It was an empty promise that carried with it not a shred of credibility.

Still, historical comparisons do carry a kernel of truth. It is not the actions of Nazi Germany or Czechoslovakia in 1938 that matter. It is the response of Europe that does. France and Britain had the military wherewithall to stop any aggressive action that Nazi Germany might have undertaken to effect a solution in its favor in the Sudetenland. Neither France nor Britain had the will to stop Germany and both paid a heavy price for this failure. Worse: Neville Chamberlain played the fool and claimed that his paper peace had ended the threat. It didn't, and he paid the ultimate political price.

Europe can and must put an end to 19th century bully politics by issuing an ultimatum to Russia. Yet, it needs to couple this with the carrot of a resolution of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that goes beyond mere posturing about national integrity. Woodrow Wilson laid the path in 1918 when he called for self-determination of peoples. Why not allowed South Ossetians and Abkhazians a vote in the matter, a vote carried out an international supervision and one free of the interference of Russian peacekeepers? By so doing, Europe could make a stand for self-determination and democracy and call Russia's bluff.

Et tu, Europa?