COLD WAR, TOO?

The origins of the Cold War were debated by scholars for years and only faded into obscurity when the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Were Soviet actions in Poland and Czechoslovakia responsible for the bill chill? Did the West contribute by rushing to re-establish a German state? Actions and reactions - some deliberate, some unintentional, some well-considered, some misguided - conspired to bring about an icy era of global tension that reached its apex in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Are we now on the verge of another Cold War, it too the product of actions and reactions that lead where no one dare go?

The Russian press. the Russian foreign minister and eminences grises such as Mikhail Gorbachev, have cited the expansion of NATO, the desire to establish a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, along with a general Wester condescension towards the successor state to the Soviet Union. Mixed in with legitimate beefs are the familiar faces of Soviet Russia: hyperbole, distortion, fabrication and outright deception.

As Russia prolongs a ceasefire that never should have been required had the United States warned Saaskavili in no uncertain terms that a military attack on South Ossetia was foolhardy and would lead to consequences that might be beyond the ability of the nascent Georgian military to cope with, the Western response is muddled and rife with recklessness. True to its macho posturing, the Bush Administration has elected to ink an agreement with Poland to emplace missiles as part of a Star Wars technology ostensibly aimed at preventing an as yet non-existent Iran threat to Europe. Talk of NATO expansion into the Ukraine and expediting Georgia's request to join NATO have provoked even more Russia bile. What's lacking is a strategy to counter Russian bully tactics.

Harvard professor Monica Toft is the latest to weigh in on the ostensible lack of military options to deal with the Russian incursion. Apparently, forward positioning of NATO naval and air fleets, combined with the assertion of air superiority across Georgian territory - sans South Ossetia and Abkhazia - is not a viable military option in their view. Have the follies of the Bush Administration so diminished our capacities that we confuse the use of military power, that is, boots on the ground, with the application of credible military threats in order to exact concessions?

Admittedly, leadership is lacking. Western Europe dallies when it should be taking the lead. Condolezza Rice still looks more the shocked inspector in Casablanca than the Russia expert she supposedly was. Didn't she see the folly of foisting a missile defense system that has failed to demonstrate any ability to work to the 90 - 95% reliability most would expect of a defense system. In the meantime, more money is wasted on a system that even under the most favorable of circumstances - knowledge of when and where without any countermeasures - barely approaches a 50% success rate.

Bush, on the other hand, remains Bush. Clueless in the face of danger, Bush lacks the moral authority to mobilize the West against Russia. Ignoring legitimate Russian concerns regarding the haste with which Kosova was granted independence and the failure to tie this action to other intractable ethnic issues - South Ossetia and Abkhazia, for instance - Bush chose to press ahead, be it with his ill-fated folly in Iraq or his declaration of the Axis of Evil.

Russia, too, is not without fault. Indeed, the issuances of passports to South Ossetian and Abkhaz citizens of Georgia goes beyond what one normally would expect of a peacekeeping power. The swiftness and coordinated nature of its response to the Georgian gambit of 6 August suggest that it was looking for an opportunity to reshuffle the deck. The lack of Russian cooperation with respect to nuclear enrichment on the part of Iran, as well as outright Russian obstinence with respect to cooperation in Polonium poisoning incident in London, are clear indicators that dealing with this new, petro-dollar rich Russia won't be easy.

Still, there were signs that Russia could cooperate. Even though the Krasnoyarsk radar site is not particularly useful in dealing with an eventual Iranian military threat, the offer could have been used to establish a joint Russian/NATO task force to work through the scenario. Here again, the Bush Administration seems to have too wedded to its plans for Poland and the Czech Republic and too easily dismissive of the Russian counter-proposal.

Rather than offer NATO membership to newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the West might have been better off extending membership in the European Union. Of course, that's not in America's interest. It has no voice in the EU. However, an ancillary defense arrangement, without the extension of formal NATO membership and the participation of relevant forces in war simulations, might have been possible, if only to reassure the Balkan states.

Conditions ought to have been attached to any such associative relationships. Resolution of ethnic disputes certainly should have been one. Why was the accession of Georgia to NATO even considered as long as Russian troops/peacekeepers occupied provinces that Georgia regarded as integral to its national territory?

No one need have conceded to Russian suzerainty over its "near abroad" either in diplomatic or military terms. Votes conducted under international supervision could have determined the fates of regions in dispute. And, granting self-determination rights still ought to be a part of a face-saving solution.

The difficulty now is to find a means to compel Russia to withdraw. Diplomacy seems the favored course, but its outcome seems uncertain at best. Issuance of an ultimatum might stand a better chance of success, but it is hard to imagine the Bush Administration mustering the requisite mettle required. Whether Europe can come up with the will to lead and undo the damage wrought by the Bush Administration in its relations with Russia is truly the great unknown. It doesn't seem to be a likely result, but it could happen.

Does anyone really want the alternative? Cold War Two?

ÇA PLAN POUR MOI!

Imagine how John and Bobby would react to the challenge posed by Russia in its two steps forward one step backward withdrawal from Georgia. They'd be spinning in their graves. Where would the West be today if the Kennedy Administration had but protested loudly and not issued an ultimatum to the Soviet Union regarding the placement of missiles in Cuba during 1962? Where would we be if President Kennedy had not assembled about him an excellent set of advisors who looked at every possible response, including the wacky ones advanced by Edward Lansdale? The chosen course, a naval blockade about Cuba, lent credibility to a game of brinkmanship that led to the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba and those missiles in Turkey that had annoyed the Soviets in the first place.

Ultimata are not especially popular, it seems. To date, no one has really come out with credible proposals that could make the cost of non-compliance to the ceasefire agreements crafted thus far too expensive for Russia to persist in its actions that suggest the desire for regime change in Tbilisi. Instead, we hear the mantra that there are no good military options. Really?

It is true that the American military is overextended due to its major commitment to Iraq and minor activity in Afghanistan. The unwillingness of the Bush Administration to curtail its commitments or to redress deficiencies in the American military by enacting draft legislation to swell the ranks of the American war machine has left the United States with few land-based options. (Of course, the generals are loathe to deal anew with draftees since the discontent exhibited by many unwilling eighteen year olds during the last unpopular war (Vietnam) did not result in the most efficient American military machine desired by the Pentagon.)

Yet, a naval blockade of Abkhazia is certainly doable. Forward positioning of NATO air force units to bases in Turkey is possible. The wresting of air superiority from woefully inferior Russian air forces could easily be accomplished. The drawing of a line in the sand or the establishment of a strict timetable with no wiggle room for interpretation for the withdrawal of Russian tanks and troops to the positions held prior to 6 August 2008 is also possible.

What is lacking is the will? Condolezza Rice seems to have lifted a page from Casablanca as she now professes to see vice everywhere. Where has she been the past several years? Is she unaware of the absolute refusal of the Russians to cooperate in the extradiction of the likely culprit in the Polonium poisoning in London a few years back? Is she unaware of the assassination of Russian reporters who dared to present a non-saccharine view of politics in Putin era state-enterprise controlled media? Is Rice, the so-called Russian expert, unaware that Russia has hardly lifted a finger to aid the West in hemming in Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy technology and its refusal to rule out the development of nuclear weapons as part and parcel of its pursuit of an alternative energy source?

At least some view the matter in a more nuanced matter. On CNN, Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, gave recognition to the reality that Russia appears to have done little to comply with agreements achieved so far and its behavior suggests that its motives go well beyond protecting the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Renowned Russia scholar, Strobe Talbott, interviewed on NPR, also voiced his deep concern over Russian behavior.

Yet, there are two sides to this story. To insist, as Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall did during her CNN interview that the national integrity of Georgia cannot be brought into question since that would lead to myriad other ethnic minorities to press their case, is pure poppycock. First, it fails to take into account the realities on the ground in South Ossetia and Abkhazia that demonstrate the inability of Georgia to make on its claim to national sovereignty over these breakaway regions. Russian troops or peacekeepers have been active since at least the mid-90s. And, in what other area of ethnic dispute do we have an instance where perhaps 90% of the residents of a breakaway region possess a passport (Russian) in addition to or in lieu of the one they ought to possess (Georgian) by dint of territorial integrity?

Nowhere.

It is true that the Armenians and the Azeris still dispute Ngorno-Karabakh, even though Armenia presently holds military sway in the issue. And yes, each of the Baltic Republics has to deal with a substantial Russian minority. The existence of these ethnic problem areas is not proof of the slippery slope argument. Rather, it is testimony to the deviousness with which Soviet authorities manipulated ethnic disputes by arbitrarily assigning boundaries and encouraging immigration of ethnic Russians into areas where their presence had been minimal.

Second, in a larger sense, the slippery slope has already taken shape. Once NATO decided to defend Kosovo in 1999 and allowed the United Nations to assume a offer protectorate status to Kosovo, a nominally Serbian territory, the die was cast. Granting Kosovo independence this spring merely confirmed that in some instances national integrity would not, and perhaps should not, be maintained.

Beyond the obvious anger that Russia expressed for the failure of the West to take its dissenting views into account and thereby continue in the interim at least Kosovo's status as a UN protectorate, it appears that Russia wished to apply the logic advanced by NATO to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Moreover, Russian commentators have ridiculed the obvious nonsense spouted by McCain and others who decry the Russian invasion as unbecoming a nation in the 21st century. Oops, I guess the American invasion of Iraq to effect regime change was the product of the 20th century politics, when the American Congress, controlled by Republicans, decided to make regime change in Iraq a goal of American policy during the Clinton era.

Georgia was foolish to believe that it had America's backing when President Saashkavili attempted to extend his earlier success in regaining control of the Kodori Gorge (in Abkhazia) by the ill-advised foray into Tskhinvali that led to the disproportionate Russian response. Ultimately, it will have to pay a price. It's a price that the Russians will insist upon and one that analysts who share Ms. Randall-Sherman's hopelessly delusional insistence on national integrity cannot seem to reconcile themselves to.

Georgia can be assuaged in perhaps a similar way to the method adopted by Europe with respect to Serbia. Association with and eventual membership in the European Union may be the only way to get Georgia to accept the loss of territories it cannot hope to regain control of militarily. Nor can it count on NATO membership, should that ensue, to alter the military balance. Russia will remain the locally superior military force. The West is simply not prepared to engage in war with Russia over territories that Georgia has not effectively controlled since the demise of the Soviet Union.

A contradiction? Not at all. The point of an ultimatum, one that achieves the desired result, is to put forth a credible military threat and combine it with substantive, diplomatic face-saving gestures that allow both sides to feel that each succeeded to a certain extent. The Kennedy Administration never admitted that the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey was a quid pro quo for the abandonment of planned Cuban missile sites and the withdrawal of already established missile bases. Yet, the two actions are inevitably linked.

For the present crisis to be resolved, Europe may need to issue an ultimatum to Russia. If so, it should privately convey to Russia that after Russian peacekeepers are withdrawn from Abkhazia and South Ossetia an internationally supervised vote will be held in order to allow the self-determination of these breakaway regions. Woodrow Wilson would be proud. And, the Russians would be delighted since the outcome of any such vote would surely favor either independence of the breakaway regions from Georgia or their association with and incorporation into Russia.

Alas, the idiocy of American foreign policy as practiced by the neo-cons and chicken hawks has left the United States with neither the moral suasion nor the credibility to issue an ultimatum to the Russians. Europeans, especially those powers that opposed the American invasion of Iraq, hold the moral high ground. It's time for them to act in concert.

Such a course might still leave the Kennedys turning in their graves. But, at least they would have appreciated that someone had lifted a page from ten days that shook the world. Turn off the remote and leave Casablanca to the realm of cinematic fantasy. See the reality. It can't only be Georgian refugees and the international media who witness the ceasefire that won't go away.

ET TU, EUROPA?

With all the Sturm and Drang the Russian offensive against Georgia has unleashed in the United States, it's easy to conclude that much of this is the inevitable response of the moronic foreign policy mavens who have made a hash of American foreign policy for the past eight years. They were warned about 9/11, but chose to ignore FBI reports and daily foreign policy briefings. Bush looked Putin in eye and was mesmerized by his baby blues. Claiming to have known the man, Bush chose to turn a blind eye toward the collapse of democracy in Russia as political assassination was used to deal with a recalcitrant press and state run industry was used to buy out independent media outlets. Encouraging both Georgia and the Ukraine to seek membership in NATO and providing American military training to the nascent Georgian army predictably antagonized a Russia still smarting over NATO's and the UN's treatment of Kosovo since 1999 and especially during the spring of 2008. Nevertheless, the failure to make an issue of the role of Russian peackeeping forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the issuance of Russian passports to nominally Georgian citizens openly defiant of attempts by Tbilisi to reassert national authority over these breakaway regions coupled with the complete failure to plan for the possibly impossible: a Russian incursion, predicated on a foolhardy Georgian attempt to extend its string of successes (over Ajara and regaining a Georgian present in the Kodori Gorge in Abkhazia) to Tskinkavali, into Georgia proper, has left the West claiming that there are very few options left.

Uncertain about the ultimate aims of the Russian incursion, Nicholas Sarkozy worked out a hastily arranged ceasefire whose specifics were differently interpreted by Tbilisi, Moscow and Paris. In the interim, Russian tanks pressed further into Georgia and paramilitary separatists from the breakaway regions proceeded into Georgia as well in order to rape and pillage those parts of Georgia no longer defended by the Georgian military. A second ceasefire agreement was required in order to clarify the vagueness of the first with respect to a timetable for the withdrawal of Russian troops back to the status quo ante of 6 August 2008. From what appears to be happening on the ground, yet a third ceasefire agreement may be required as Russian tanks keep pressing closer to Tbilisi.

Beyond the usual difficulty of getting the European Union to act as one, the constant refrain that there are precious few (military) options is repeated as mantra. If, by military options, reference is made to ground troops intervening in Georgia to stand as a buffer or tripwire between the Georgian capital and advancing Russian tanks, then there probably are not any such troops available. The American military is already overextended by the military sideshow in Iraq. NATO is taxed to the max by its intervention in Afghanistan. And, there does not seem to be a general willingness in any European capital to call up reserves in order to put together a credible military force (troops) to intervene in Georgia.

However, such an analysis fails to examine whether NATO air and naval forces could lend emphasis to the urgency of Russian compliance with ceasefire agreements. These forces are not stretched too thinly by the Iraqi or the Afghani operations. As such, they could provide an implied response if Russia does not withdraw its forces immediately and puts an end to the looting of the Georgian countryside.

In the 19th century, the issuance of such ultimata was typical. However, given the disastrous results of ultimata issued in the wake of the assassination of the Austrian archduke in Sarajevo which led to all-side mobilizations for general war, ultimata have been rarely used. The last major ultimatum issued was the imposition of a naval blockade about Cuba during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. It worked but not before the world had to fret during ten days that shook the world.

For ultimata to work, the implied military threat must be credible. Would the designation of a line beyond which Russian tanks dare not advance lest they be fired upon by NATO aircraft pose a credible threat? Maybe. One thing it would probably not lead to, as some critics have asserted, is a natural gas embargo against Europe. And, even if one were attempted, it's the wrong time of the year to attempt a natural gas embargo in order to bring Europe to its knees. The best time for that would be winter.

An ultimatum certainly would not lead to nuclear retaliation, as some bloggers have asserted. The Russian nuclear capability has degraded to a certain extent and the problem still remains: would any rational leader risk mutually assured destruction over limited geo-political aims? The answer now, as it was back in 1962, was no.

At the same time, there must be an incentive for the Russians to comply with the ceasefire agreements achieved so far and perhaps the additional ones to be negotiated in days to come. No one benefits from the status quo ante. As much as Russia enjoys all the tactical and strategic advantages from the presence of its peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russian military might and the unilateral issuances of passports has not dissuaded Georgia from an eventual reassertion of state control over the breakaway regions. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Russians perhaps are seeking regime change in Tbilisi is that the Georgian government seems loathe to abandon its desire to restore complete national sovereignty over its territory.

On the other hand, the status quo ante does not offer Georgia much other than the return to its own control of undisputed Georgian territory, as well as perhaps the regaining of the Kodori Gorge, now reoccupied by insurgent and Russian forces. The status quo ante does not eliminate the basis for Georgian discontent.

Unfortunately, there will be a price for Georgian foolhardiness. Territorial integrity, as proclaimed by Georgia, is probably a non-starter. Whether Abkhazia and South Ossetia attain de facto independence as autonomous regions within Georgia, an existence as independent statelets, or reintegration into Russia, one outcome can be ruled out. Russia will never agree to Georgian sovereignty over these regions. To stubbornly assert territorial integrity is to risk further Russian hostility.

Georgia can be compensated for the formal loss of territory it hasn't controlled since the early 1990s. Immediate accession to NATO and an accelerated membership into the European Union could erase some of the inevitable bitterness that the permanent loss of territory entails. In this regard, the case of Serbia is no different from Georgia. Serbia cannot reacquire Kosovo, despite its deeply rooted historic claims. Both population dynamics and the realities on the ground doom any Serbian wishful thinking. Membership in the European Union does, however, concrete benefits to a Serbia and could succeed in loosening the ties that bind Russia and Serbia.

Despite Saaskashvili's vigorous protestations to the contrary, we are not witnessing a reprise of Munich in 1938. German troops did not occupy Bohemia or Moravia. Nazi Germany had not issued passports to nominally Czech, German speaking citizens. It did threaten military intervention and was willing to use fifth column elements in the Sudetenland as an excuse to intervene military, but Munich was a deal conceived as a means to avert warfare. Georgia, on the other hand, is dealing with an army of occupation that is presiding over the looting of the Georgian countryside.

Nor are the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 especially illuminating contrary to Ms. Rice's assertions. Both of these countries lay behind the then Iron Curtain and NATO had no possible means to assert any military force without invading another country or inviting a response from Warsaw Pact forces. That John Foster Dulles promised American assistance to Hungary is as irrelevant now as it was then. It was an empty promise that carried with it not a shred of credibility.

Still, historical comparisons do carry a kernel of truth. It is not the actions of Nazi Germany or Czechoslovakia in 1938 that matter. It is the response of Europe that does. France and Britain had the military wherewithall to stop any aggressive action that Nazi Germany might have undertaken to effect a solution in its favor in the Sudetenland. Neither France nor Britain had the will to stop Germany and both paid a heavy price for this failure. Worse: Neville Chamberlain played the fool and claimed that his paper peace had ended the threat. It didn't, and he paid the ultimate political price.

Europe can and must put an end to 19th century bully politics by issuing an ultimatum to Russia. Yet, it needs to couple this with the carrot of a resolution of Abkhazia and South Ossetia that goes beyond mere posturing about national integrity. Woodrow Wilson laid the path in 1918 when he called for self-determination of peoples. Why not allowed South Ossetians and Abkhazians a vote in the matter, a vote carried out an international supervision and one free of the interference of Russian peacekeepers? By so doing, Europe could make a stand for self-determination and democracy and call Russia's bluff.

Et tu, Europa?

WELCOME BACK, WOODROW

In January 1918, Woodrow Wilson presented his fourteen points regarding the coming peace in Europe to the American Congress. Points 9 through 13 dealt specifically with issues regarding the self-determination of peoples in the Balkans and in Austria-Hungary, the uniting of all Italians within the borders of Italy, and the granting of independence to non-Turkish peoples formerly locked in the Ottoman Empire. Wilson did not live to see the fruition of some of these goals. Czechoslovakia gained its independence from Austria-Hungary. Poland re-emerged among the community of nations. And, in the Balkans, a uniting of sorts of South Slavic peoples in the kingdom of Yugoslavia gave hope that perhaps a new era was underway. Unfortunately, self-determination did not extend southward as Britain and France carved up the remnants of the Turkish empire in Arabia to extend the range of these weakened, but still present colonial powers.

Of course, the creation of newly independent states in Europe did not solve all problems. The mixing of peoples throughout the ages, the development of urban enclaves ethnically different from their rural surroundings and the failure to reconcile the principle of uniting one people in one country (Germany) with the return of Elsass/Lothringen to France did not bode well for a stress free ethnic future. Ethnic Germans were trapped inside the new borders of Czechoslovakia and Italy. Despite the promise of a vote to determine their future, Austrians were denied the right to join with Germany in the creation of a pan-Germanic state.

In the Balkans, placing all southern Slavs in one state might have seemed sensible. After all, they were all Slavs and more or less shared a similar language: Serbo-Croatian. Yet, different religious backgrounds - Catholic, Orthodox and Muslim - were not necessarily unifying factors. Different political experiences - life under the Turks versus life under Austria-Hungary - also did not bode well for the creation of a viable state. The fact that many Greeks still lived on the Anatolian coast in Asia Minor while ethnic Turks still lived in the Balkans did not promise a peaceful resolution of conflicting Wilsonian principles.

And, indeed, they did not. Croats and Serbs used the interwar period to build up their own ethnic hit squads which were unleashed in the wake of Hitler's conquest of Europe. The Greeks and Ottoman Turks engaged in a short-lived war in 1921 that ultimately led to the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the forced resettlement of several million Greeks and Turks and the uneasy coexistence of Greeks and Turks on the island of Cyprus. Germans in the Sudetenland chafed under rule by Czechs and Hitler was able to exploit such tensions to compel Czechoslovakia to give up these lands with the blessing of Britain's Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.

Perhaps Wilson was unaware of the hopes and aspirations his fourteen points had given to ethnic minorities everywhere. In the event, the demise of Nazi Germany eliminated one of the issues unresolved by the Treaty of Versailles. Ethnic Germans were driven out of East Prussia (Kaliningrad today), the joint occupancy of Danzig/Gdansk under Polish and German authority was, already ended by the Nazis, was buried for good, ethnic Germans fled Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia and Poland was awarded part of Prussia - east of the Oder-Neisse - in compensation for the loss of its territory to the Soviet Union.

In the 1990s, the experiment of Yugoslavia came to a bloody ending as first Slovenia, then Croatia sought to free themselves from Yugoslavia. The brief war against Croatia by Serbia was eclipsed by the cruelty of ethnic cleansing that shook Bosnia-Herzogovina as Muslims and Serbs (in the Republic of Srpska) battled it out until the NATO airwar against Serbia led to the Dayton accords. With the independence of Kosova from Serbia in 2008 and the peaceful splitting of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia seemed to put an end to most struggles for self-determination within Europe. True, the Basques remained unsatisfied with their status in Spain and occasional bombings and kidnappings punctuated their demand for independence. Yet, most of Europe was committed to a peaceful resolution of remaining issues whether it be the fate of Belgium or autonomy for German speaking citizens in South Tyrol.

Unfortunately, with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic issues long suppressed in the Soviet Empire began to reemerge. The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had to deal with the effects of massive Russian immigration to these former Soviet republics after World War II. The emergence of independent states in the Caucusus region - Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan - immediately led to ethnic conflicts that escalated to open warfare in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and in Armenia over Ngorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan. The presence of a buffer Georgian state between Armenia and Russia allowed Armenia to escape with a military resolution of its claim over Ngorno-Karabakh in Armenia's favor. (Nachichevan, a province of Azerbaijan, but located to the south and west of Armenia and completely cut off from Azerbaijan, remains a bone of contention.) The same could not be said for Georgia. Russian troops came to the aide of breakaway regions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Though Georgia claimed sovereignty over these regions and ethnic Georgians did still reside in some parts of these disputed regions, the presence of Russian "peacekeepers" and the later issuance of Russian passports in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to perhaps 90% of the populations of these breakaway regions certainly suggested to rebel Abkhaz and South Ossetians that George would never ever be able to reassert sovereignty over these regions.

Georgia finally was able to reassert control over the one region in dispute that did not border Russia. The southern province of Ajara was brought back under full Georgian authority not least because of the corruption of its dictatorial leader during its "independence". Yet, the Georgian gambit to regain control of South Ossetia blew up horribly during the 2008 Olympics. A Georgian military foray into the South Ossetian capital was ferociously resisted by rebels and Russian forces. Russian tanks poured across the border into South Ossetia and pressed forward into Georgia proper via Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

As understandable as Georgian frustrations with respect to its citizens driven from Abkhazia and as vexing as the inability to resolve the twin issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia peacefully due to Russian intransigence inevitably raise the question as to Georgia's future. Should the republic continue to insist that its sovereignty extends to those regions assigned to it during Soviet times? Or, should the Georgians accept the loss of these regions and their possible incorporation into Russia?

They may not have a choice. As Russia uses the present "ceasefire" to maintain its grip over the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and extend its presence in Georgia, Georgia may be presented with a fait accompli. Acceptance of Georgia of the new status quo may depend on the extension of NATO membership to Georgia and the commitment of European developmental funds to Georgia and its eventual admission into the European Community.

Whether Russia will agree to such an arrangement depends very much on its intentions with respect to the present crisis. Certainly, the Georgians precipitated a Russian response, but that response had been long planned as it seems. And, the Georgian response was the culmination of failed attempts to restart negotiations towards a peaceful resolution of all outstanding issues. The latest failure, the attempt to negotiate in Bonn under the aegis of United Nations' General Secretary Ban-ki Moon Group of Friends of Georgia, may have signaled that neither Russian nor its protectorates has any incentive to resolve the issues based on continued Georgian sovereignty.

Does Russia wish to recreate a greater Russian sphere of influence in the Caucuses? Is it signalling its desire to bring back former Soviet republics such as the Ukraine and Georgia back into Russia proper? Is Russia using the present dispute over South Ossetia to express its extreme discontent over the granting of independence to Kosovo earlier in the year?

The Russian Duma did hold hearings after the granting of independence of Kosovo in order to determine whether the principle established by the United Nations should also be applied to Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Though no one seriously expects these regions to remain independent should the Kosovo principle be extended to these areas of dispute, the Russians do have a point. As Wilson might have agreed, the residents of these areas ought to have some right of self-determination, even if that means reuniting with Russia.

Certainly Georgia might not wish to allow a vote of self-determination. It may not have any choice anyway. Romania, however, has a stronger case. Moldova is a region historically associated with Romania. Yet, during the post-World War II period, Russians were sent to the area after it was wrested from Romania as part of the post war settlement. Does this eliminate Romania's historical claim to Moldavia?

Wilson opened this can of worms by clearing expressing the principle of self-determination. The practicalities have eluded us ever since. Just as Romania might lay an historic claim to Moldavia, so too can Hungary lay claim to Transylvania, now a part of Romania. At some point, realities on the ground should be allowed to decide the immediate. Let Moldova go just as South Ossetia and Abkhazia ought to be allowed to go.

What Wilson failed to anticipate and what gives hope that his dream of self-determination of peoples might just succeed was the creation of the European Community and its extension beyond the original six members of the European Coal and Steel Agreement. Whether Transylvania nominally belongs to Hungary or Romania does not matter as long as within the structure of the European Community minorities retain their rights and have a place to sue for grievances (the European Court) and can freely move about. Georgians may not obtain that right if both South Ossetia and Abkhazia eventually return to Russia. But membership in NATO and the EC just might allow them to maintain their independence of Russia, to continue along the path of democracy and to enjoy further economic development.

GEORGIA ON MY MIND

The ongoing Russian invasion of the former Soviet republic of Georgia has lit up neo-cons and
liberal hawks of the Democratic center. John McCain seeks to use the Russian attack to profile his leadership abilities. Barack Obama's advisors, such as New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, suggest that Obama would never have let the relationship between the United States and Russian deteriorate to the extent that Russia would brazenly risk a break in relations by engaging in the disproportionate resort to violence that has wracked the Caucusus region since the ill-fated attempt by Georgian President Saakashvili to reimpose Georgian control in South Ossetia. Meanwhile, civilians are fleeing towards Tiblisi, the world's energy markets worry about the fate of the trans-Georgian oil pipeline if a ceasefire does not soon ensue, and everyone wonders what the West can and might do to prevent a war of re-conquest if the Russians press forward.

For all of George Bush's tough talk towards Russia, there seems little that the United States can do. Whether training the Georgian military and U.S. support for Georgian accession into NATO encouraged reckless disregard for the threat potential posed by Russian troops in and around Abkhazia and South Ossetia is beside the point. Whatever Georgia hoped to achieve by sending its forces into South Ossetia, nominally a part of Georgia, has long since been lost as the republic seeks to hang on to whatever independence it might still have.

Does Russia wish to retrieve back into the fold the newly independent countries on its periphery during the free-falling 90s when the Soviet Union became unglued, ceased to exist and Russia wallowed in economic misery. Buoyed by revenues generated from its exports of oil and gas, a newly invigorated Russia has not hesitated to employ its new economic power by withholding gas supplies to the Ukraine when Ukraine demonstrated its new found loyalty to the West. Past disputes with Georgia over South Osettia and Abkhazia have ended with the very strange result that Russian forces served as peacekeepers in the latter two breakaway regions while the Russian government issued passports to Georgian citizens opposed to rule from Tiblisi.

While the United States squandered moral prestige, soldiers and the public treasury on the foray into Iraq, Russia has openly pulled away from the West. The most obvious confrontation has been over the placement of missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic in order to deter Iran and prevent the development of nuclear weapons as Iran pursues nuclear energy. Diplomatically, Russia has not helped present a united Western in order to force Iran to renounce nuclear weapons. What once looked like a new era in Russian-American relations after the breakup of the Soviet Union, now seems to have entered a new, uncharted era as an assertive Russia seeks to restore order on its periphery. How will and how should the West respond?

The most pressing need is to bring about an end to the Russian invasion before Russian troops occupy Tiblisi and carry the action to - perhaps - its logical end. If that is the Russian goal - to occupy the Georgian seat of power and remove its democratically elected president from office - then a more vigorous Western response is required. NATO ought to quietly deliver an ultimatum to Putin and state in emphatic terms that an occupation of Tiblisi is a line that cannot be crossed. Should the Russian assault press forward, then NATO should threaten aerial bombardment of attacking Russian troops and raise the cost that Russia would have to pay in order to accomplish its goal. Clearly, Georgia can do little to slow down or prevent a Russian attack on Tiblisi if that's what Russia intends. Only a NATO show of force could give the Russians pause.

To accomplish a halt to the Russian invasion, it might very well require the abandonment of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the recognition of these regions as independent republics. Whether the Russians would accept such a limited outcome given the very real possibility that Russia could at least incorporate these areas into Russia proper based on the results so far is a crucial question. And, it may very well imply that the crisis in Georgia cannot be resolved without the participation of NATO air forces. At the moment, Russia has no incentive to stop its invasion. Nor is there any reason to see why Russia would allow a return to status quo ante. Its forces have already put an end to the basis for Russian-Georgian strife by occupying both rebel regions and driving out all Georgian troops.

Of course, it is entirely possible that the West will ignore Georgia's plight and concede that it can have no impact on Russian aims on in areas on the Russian periphery. That, however, should scare the Baltic countries, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, along with Ukraine. To simply allow Russia to bully its will on a weak power and perhaps swallow it back into the fold is to kowtow to military and economic might. Europe cannot afford that since its energy dependence on Russia is painfully obvious. Nor does such tacit acceptance of Russian aggression, even if explained away by the lack of alternatives, does not bode well. We've been down this road before when the West abandoned Czechoslovakia to the Nazis.

Whatever the response to the Russian invasion, it cannot be simply an American response. This must be a European and American response under the guise of NATO. France is a key player as it presently heads the European community. That France has been active in dispatching Bernard Kouchner to Tiblisi is hopeful, but actions speak louder than words.

HE SAID, HE SAID; THERE'S A SURGE IN MY HEAD

As if it weren't difficult enough to keep up with the ever-changing McCain position on the "surge" and everything thing it has helped make possible in Iraq - the Sunni Awakening, a reduction in violence in and around Baghdad - Michael O'Hanlan of the Brookings Institution assures us that "McCain is three-quarters right in this debate", even though he cannot get the chronology correct. What, however, is the debate about? That, too, is becoming even more difficult to fathom. Is it simply: is the "surge" a success? Or, is it a question of where the "surge" leads us in Iraq?

Apparently, McCain wants to keep the focus on whether or not the "surge" has been a success. Why? Well, for one, it is certainly a means to needle Mr. Obama and other Democrats in the House and Senate who initially rejected the proposed "surge" and cautioned that it might likely produce a worsening of sectarian violence by letting the Iraqi government off the hook. Senator Reid's claim in April 2007 that the war appears lost looks especially silly now that a substantial reduction in violence has occurred.

Second, it is a useful device for putting Senator Obama on the spot. To date, Senator Obama has not yet come up with an effective response. Claiming that there were other factors besides the surge or suggesting we might also debate the merits of the American involvement in Iraq, as Obama has frequently done, have not taken the wind out of McCain's vocal bludgeoning. It may not even be possible to still such a cheap political diatribe. Yet, we would be wise to recall, as John Edwards did when pressed by Larry King for a quick reaction to the president's speech on the evening of 10 January 2007 announcing a temporary surge in American forces in Iraq, that "the truth is we have no idea what's going to happen in Iraq". We didn't then, we still don't now.

Nor did Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina who, on the same program with John Edwards and John McCain, have any idea of what the outcome of an increase in U.S. combat forces in Iraq would be. Also pressed by Larry King for a quick, final comment, Senator Graham indicated that he hoped the "surge" would work. As Senator Graham had pointed out earlier in the roundtable discussion, "The old strategy failed. The new strategy might fail. I think it's our best chance for victory and let's give it a chance."

Senator McCain, however, was not so shy. Unabashedly, he assured King that he strongly felt that with enough troops in certain areas, including Anbar Province that American and Iraqi forces could provide a stable environment. But even Senator McCain could not guarantee that the "surge" would be a success. Rather, he pointed out the consequences of failure. If the "surge" were to fail, then, as Senator McCain viewed it, the war would be lost and that, he felt, would have devastating consequences not only for the region, but for U.S. domestic security.

Despite Larry King's efforts to pin down his guests for a simple answer to a complex question, the fact is that even then, after President Bush's address to the nation announcing the "surge", the various guests, in a roundtable of sorts moderated by Larry King, were talking past one another. Democrats, having little or no faith in the Bush Administration, were skeptical that the proposed troop increase would have any practical effect, while Republicans hoped for the best.

How could this be otherwise? Democrats were unlikely to place any more faith in an administration that had just let New Orleans drown and seemed helpless in the face of daily monstrosities in Baghdad? Previous pronouncements by the Bush Administration that American soldiers would be greeted as liberators, that the mission had already been accomplished by April 2003, or that the insurgency consisted only of dead-enders had been torn asunder as the insurgency took hold and expanded across Iraq. Claims that the election of a new Iraqi government constitued a milestone which would usher in an era of democracy in Iraq proved to be nothing more than hogwash. The constant in-fighting within the newly elected government, the fragility of its coalition, and the inability of the government to enact any meaningful legislation were daily reminders that political reconciliation was far from certain. That the newly trained Iraqi army seemed incapable of accomplishing even the simplest of limited military objectives or even forging an identity as Iraqi soldiers above and beyond the call of sectarianism cast grave doubt on the ability of the American forces to rely on or even partner with such forces in order to reduce violence within Iraq. Was it any wonder, short of a withdrawal of American troops, that the Democrats doubted the Iraqi government would ever assume responsibility for political reconciliation and that the Iraqi army might finally stand up so that American forces could stand down, be withdrawn or redeployed to Afghanistan?

Republicans, on the other hand, focused on the need to avoid failure in Iraq, failure that seemed imminent. They rejected claims such as that made by Senator Harry Reid that the war in Iraq was already lost, though many Republicans had already concluded that the Bush Administration had badly bungled the war thus far. Still, most Republicans were unwilling to toss in their cards and walk away from the game. As long as the president's new policy, the "surge" promised a different strategy, they were willing to give it a try. Indeed, as was noted at the time, the "surge" became known as the McCain Doctrine, as Senator McCain had been its most vociferous advocate.

And what was Senator McCain advocating? Like many other military analysts in and out of government, additional troops were needed to quell the daily violence, especially in Baghdad, that threatened to descend into full-scale civil war. Yet, simply sending more troops in support of the existing strategy was not a solution either. As Senator McCain noted, for four years the American military had followed a nonsensical strategy of clear and move on. Senator McCain advocated a return to the classic counterinsurgency strategy of clear and hold, but that strategy required many more troops than Rumsfeld was prepared to field.

It seems pointless now to debate who was right. At the time, no one could have foreseen what might transpire. Indeed, one of the pillars upon which the relative peace in Iraq has been constructed was the incredibly successful Sunni Awakening, armed and encouraged by American forces, but one whose existence could not have simply been brought about by an additional 30,000 US forces mostly dispatched to Baghdad. During the president's speech only one paragraph was devoted to events that were happening in Anbar. Yet, Bush emphasized what American forces were doing in Anbar, not what the former Sunni insurgents were about to do. The fact that virtually everything positive that has occurred in Anbar Province was the result of the Sunni Awakening was buried as President Bush mentioned but in passing that "local tribal leaders have begun to show their willingness to take on al Qaeda." It was hoped that this would present American forces an opportunity to deal a serious blow to the terrorists operating in Anbar Province. As a result, Bush gave orders to increase American troop strength in Anbar by 4,000 troops. As luck would have it, however, it wasn't the increased presence of American troops in Anbar that turned the tide. Rather, it was arming former Sunni insurgents and allowing them to do battle with Al-Qaeda, whom the tribal chiefs had grown tired of.

Of course, Senator Obama has shown an unwillingness to admit that his views on the "surge" were premature, at least. A healthy skepticism, as stated by John Edwards, was clearly in order, but was least likely to be expressed by senators and Congressmen who had grown weary of Bush double talk on Iraq.

Yes, Senator McCain guessed correctly about the "surge". Or, should we simply say that his gambit paid off. Clearly, the senator was correct when he dismissed the old strategy of clear and move on as utterly absurd. As a counterinsurgency strategy, it was doomed to failure as insurgents would move back in after the troops had moved on. What was required was clear and hold. Whether the American forces were large enough to conduct clear and hold was always subject to debate. And, one could correctly note that no one knew for certain whether 30,000 additional troops would suffice. 30,000 was simply the amount of extra forces that could be squeezed out all available troops by extending lengths of deployment and cutting back on rest and retraining at home. And, the "surge" had to be temporary since it risked burning out American forces already stretched too thinly.

At the time, the "surge" was a big gamble, one whose prospects did not look especially inviting, given the level of violence in Baghdad and the inability of the Iraqi government to dismantle the militias or even to govern effectively. It was one roll of the dice that might have sunk American troops into another year of quagmire in Iraq, might have had no effect at all, might have produced a barely noticeable effect, might have had a definite, but limited impact, or might have accomplished everything Bush said it would in his speech. Who knew? In truth, no one knew.

Let's accept that the "surge", aided and abetted by the twin pillars of the Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province and the unilateral ceasefire that has more or less held between the Mahdi Army and the Iraqi government, has worked. The debate now should focus on where this "success" leads us. It is a undeniable fact that the Iraqi government has failed to exploit the era of relative calm that the three pillars have provided. Iraqis seem no more capable now than they did in January 2007 of assuming complete control of Iraq's borders and provinces. Yes, the Iraqi government is in nominal control of more provinces now than it controled back then, but whether this is a temporary phase or the start of something meaningful is hard to gauge. Regardless, political reconciliation as envisioned in the benchmarks accompanying Bush's speech have hardly been achieved, even if one agrees with O'Hanlan's assessment that on a scale of 1 to 10, the Iraqi government has achieved a 5.5, a mark that can retreat, advance or hover at this mark, depending on what transpires in Iraq.

Democrats are correct to insist that as long as substantial American forces remain in Iraq, neither the Iraqi government nor its fledling army will truly stand on its own. Proof of this has been repeatedly on offer, but no more so than the almost catastrophic hasty deployment of Iraqi forces in March to reclaim Basra from criminal gangs and the elements of the Mahdi Army who initially acted alone, but required American attack support in order to save face. The later assault on Sadr City also left many questioning the ability of the Iraqi Army to accomplish even the simplest of tasks, especially when American combat forces observed Iraqi soldiers abandoning their positions.

No, Mr. O'Hanlan, John McCain in not three-quarters right in this debate. What he wants to debate really isn't worth debating. It's simply gotcha politics at its worst. What we should be debating is where this period of relative clam leads us. Does it lead to a phased withdrawal of American forces so that they can be retrained and refurbished for redeployment to Afghanistan? Is the timeline for these phased withdrawals to be determined solely by the officers in the field, as McCain seems to desire, by the wishes of the Iraqi government, as Maliki now appears to advocate, by the pressing need for more troops in Afghanistan,as Obama acknowledges, or by the desire of an American public that increasingly regards the loss of more than 4,000 troops in Iraq for the most dubious of reasons and the most illusive of goals as reason enough alone to end the waste of American human, physical and financial capital.

Or maybe it's enough to demand that Senator McCain just define victory. Then, he might explain how the "surge" leads us to victory rather than just guide us away from defeat, as he initially proclaimed. Because it is only victory that will allow a President McCain to consider returning American troops home or redeploying them to Afghanistan.

What price victory? That storied phrase has been used repeatedly as a note of caution when considering the sheer carnage that accompanies victory. The victory at Normandy in 1944 cost many, many GIs their lives, as wave after wave of Allied forces sought to establish a foothold on Nazi-controlled French soil. Victory over Hitler justified that price.

What about Iraq? We know the price of victory in Iraq. It costs this country $12 billion per month. Yet, we don't know what the victory is that this price is being paid for. Saddam is gone, but what remains seems as dysfunctional as ever. We just don't know what victory means and perhaps we never shall, given that the basis for this war was built on lies, deception and exaggeration.

Unfortunately, Senator McCain was in on the hype from the beginning. Though even he had to admit that what ensued was badly mangled, he still refuses to draw the relevant conclusion that victory, as initially described (democracy in the desert) is unlikely to result. So, what then should we settle for, Senator McCain? Tell us now before you mangle chronology even further. Stop the distortions and contortions that threaten to render facts unrecognizable. And, above all, avoid the temptation to accuse Mr. Obama of being a defeatist who would rather win a campaign than conduct an ill-begotten war to the bitter end.

BEING JOHN McCAIN

Of all the things that should never be said, written or asserted, one should not state, as Thomas Friedman wrote in today's (23 July 2008) New York Times that "McCain was right about the surge". Forget, for a moment, that Friedman was catastrophically wrong about Iraq during the early stages when other liberal pundits proclaimed the "liberating potential" of the invasion for both Iraq and the Middle East. Forget, too, that "surge" is but a euphemism for "escalation" that was chosen to mask what could have been a potentially disastrous attempt to up the ante in Iraq. But, let's not forget the basic facts, facts that McCain contorts, misconstrues, and, when all else fails, creates on a daily basis. The "surge" is neither fish nor fowl. It was a belated attempt to rectify what many analysts and military leaders had recognized as a fundamental flaw in the Bush/Cheney/Rumsfeld strategy on Iraq. As General Shinseki noted, before being pressed into retirement, too few troops were expected to accomplish far too much in Iraq. The "surge" was a small step in correcting that colossal mistake.

McCain has made the "surge" the centerpiece of his electoral strategy on foreign policy. Recently, he has claimed that the "surge", a product of the post 2006 election disaster for the Bushidos and a response to the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, made possible the Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province. McCain now further asserts that the surge, opposed by Obama, was instrumental in preventing assassination of the Sunni sheikh who initiated talks with American military forces in Anbar. Had we heeded Obama's opposition, the sheikh surely would have been assassinated. Sending additional American forces to Baghdad, a feat not accomplished until summer 2007, was instrumental in keeping the Sunni Awakening alive, asserts McCain, even though the sheikh who began it all was nevertheless assassinated, despite the surge.

However one evaluates the present period of relative calm in Iraq, it is important to recognize that the "surge" was not solely responsible for what has transpired in Iraq over the past 18 months. This relative calm and general decline in violence began in September 2006, shortly before the American mid-term elections, when some Sunni tribal leaders approached American forces in Anbar Province. Those overtures led to the Sunni Awakening which McCain now claims that his "surge" facilitated. In fact, the "surge" only became a topic of political debate in the United States after the disastrous mid-term elections that saw a surge in Democratic victories in Senate, Congressional and statewide elections. And, the "surge" was the Bush Administrations response to recommendations made by the independent Iraq Study Group. Public debate about an escalation of American forces in Iraq began in January 2007, four months after the Sunni Awakening after the president address the nation on 10 January 2007,

Yet, this escalation has always been euphemistically described as a temporary "surge" in American forces that would allow a period of relative calm to ensue so that the Iraqi government could accomplish important political benchmarks that might allow the eventual stand-down of American combat forces. Mr. Bush "sold" the American Congress and public on the political benchmarks in order to avoid the appearance of endless escalation that characterized futile efforts of the Johnson Administration to gain the upper hand in the war in Vietnam. To date, even the most favorable of analysts towards the Bush Administration, Michael O'Hanlan, has given the Iraqi government a 5.5 on a scale of 11 (the 11 political indices) towards accomplishment of the political benchmarks. Whatever its military successes, the "surge" has not achieved all that has been promised.

It still might, however. Indeed, Senator Obama wishes to use this period of calm to redeploy combat forces to Afghanistan. Such an act would surely demonstrate whether the Iraqi Army and government are capable of dealing with the remaining insurgency and holding together a country that often seems on the brink of imploding. McCain, of course, tried to out-ante Obama by suggesting a deployment of three brigades to Afghanistan. Whether these additional forces would be created whole cloth out of thin air or represent redeployment of American combat forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, McCain can't seem to explain. For, in reality, he has no plan to significantly draw down American forces in Iraq. He will await the generals on the ground recommendation. And, as McCain has stated several times, he would like to maintain forces in Iraq for many years to come, much as an American military presence has been maintained in Germany and Korea for the past 50 years. That continued occupation of Iraq, albeit without risk to American troops, may everything to do with the desire of some military analysts to maintain combat troops in Iraq in order to maintain pressure on Iran and keep assets for a possible invasion of Iran close at hand cannot be ruled out. Joking, as McCain has done in the past, about the need to "Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb Iran" (sung to the tune of the Beach Boys' Barbara Ann) may not be accidental. It might well explain why McCain does not seem in a hurry to extract U.S. combat forces for Iraq.

What McCain cannot seem to fathom is that this period of relative calm in Iraq that has ebbed and flowed, but maintained a more or less steady hold and outward expansion from Baghdad is not just the product of the temporary "surge" in American military forces. Rather, the "surge" is but one of three pillars that has given the Iraqi government in Baghad and its armed forces an opportunity to address some of the major political issues remaining in Iraq. Call it what you will, but reducing this period of possibility to the "surge", as McCain proclaims daily, distorts what has made possible this period of calm.

To place the major emphasis, as the recent McCain contortions demonstrate over and over, on the "surge" as the main contributing factor in bringing about a reduction in violence, is to reverse the order of importance. As George Packer, author of "The Assassins' Gate", wrote in the July issue of the New Yorker. "The improved conditions can be attributed, in increasing order of importance to President Bush's surge, the change in military strategy under General David Petraeus, the turning of Sunni tribes agaist Al Qaeda, the Sadr militia's unilateral cease-fire, and the great historical luck that brought them all together at the same moment."

The oft-heralded Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province, facilitated by the decision of the American military to respond to overtures from Sunni tribesman by providing arms in order to fight Al-Qaeda in Iraq, has been responsible for taming Anbar. Assassinations of Sunni leaders in Anbar Province still occur, but Al-Qaeda has definitely been hurt by former insurgents who stopped fighting American forces and resisting the Shiite government in Baghdad. Without the relative calm, the Sunni Awakening initiated, the "surge", as McCain views it, would not have been as nearly successful as it has been.

On the other hand, the ongoing ceasefire of sorts between the Mahdi Army forces loyal to Moktadr al-Sadr has also led to a reduction of violence in Iraq. True, the Iraqi Army did rush headlong and prematurely into an attack on Mahdi forces and criminal gangs in Basra in March and had to be bailed out by American combat forces. True, the assault on Mahid forces in Sadr City also required American combat forces. Nevertheless, al-Sadr has recognized his weakened political hand and has withheld a declaration of open war on the Shiite government in Iraq.

To date, the Iraqi government still has not been able to fully exploit the space created by these three pillars. It has not managed to pass oil legislation that would see an equitable distribution of the profits of oil wealth among the three main ethnic divisions in Iraq. Nor has it managed to pass enabling legislation to facilitate provincial elections that are supposed to be held in October. As a result, the political realm remains fragile.

But so too do the other pillars of this period of relative peace in Iraq. Though the Sunni Awakening has done much to reduce the insurgency carried out by Al-Qaeda in Iraq, integration of former Sunni insurgents into the new Iraqi Army has remained stalled. Whether the Maliki government will ever fully accept Sunni insurgents as fully integrated members of the new Iraqi Army remains a thorn. It is possible that the United States has merely succeeded in arming both sides of the ethnic divide in Iraq. Should the always tense relations between Sunni and Shia devolve into open ethnic violence, ecalation of sectarian violence might well have been facilitated by American arms.

On the other hand, Moktadr al-Sadr continues to remain a thorn in the side of the Iraqi government which recognizes the threat his militia poses to the Iraqi government and demands an end to violence and a dismantling of private militias in order for al-Sadr to compete in provincial elections. Al-Sadr cannot seem to decide whether he should cast his fate with the Iraqi government and risk vilification at the hands of his sometimes renegade Mahdi Army or remain outside of the government and continue to oppose American occupation of Iraq. The ceasefire continues, but its continuation rests on a shoddy foundation.

Unfortunately, McCain demonstrates none of the nuances of such analysis nor the mastery of its details in his daily proclamations on Iraq. It can't be easy being John McCain. Perhaps Cindy McCain should spend some of her inheritance and wealth generated by beer-swilling Arizonans to provide a private tutor for McCain. Maybe then he could gain a broadly based, nuanced understanding of the origin, nature and prospects of the "surge", reflect on how the United States got in this mess in the first place, consider where a successful "surge" might take us, learn something about Iraq's place in the world including its immediate neighbors and study the history of the British occupation of Baghdad in the 1920s.

Yes, it cannot be easy being John McCain. But can we or the world afford another eight years of buffoonery in the Oval Office? Can we survive another four years of Bush lite? That, my friends, is an even bigger gamble than the escalation that John McCain pushed for in January 2007. The stakes are even higher, and might not be what we can afford to risk.